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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout most of the 20th Century, the Mafia frustrated federal 
prosecutors. The law did not aid law enforcement in prosecuting large 
criminal enterprises. Before the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RIC0),1 prosecuting organized crime was "an 
awkward affair. "2 The government's efforts in law enforcement and 
criminal prosecutions were ineffectual against sophisticated crime 
circles. 3 When organized crime leaders were apprehended, the 
government often charged them for what seemed to be insignificant 
offenses. The larger meaning of these offenses was not exposed in 
court under common law evidentiary standards and procedural rules. 
As a result, courtroom drama never exposed the overarching picture of 
organized crime. 
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) as part of a comprehensive effort to change 
the means by which the government attacked organized crime.4 RICO's 
•Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Elkhart County, Indiana; Notre Dame Law School, J.D. 
2006; Northern Arizona University, B.S. 2003. For invaluable comments, suggestions, and 
inspiration, thanks to Amber Pezan, John Gunnigle, and especially Prof. G. Robert Blakey. 
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961-
1968 (2001), amended by U.S.A. Patriot Act, tit. VIII,§ 813, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001). 
2. Effectiveness of the Government's Attack on La Cosa Nostra: Before the Permanent 
Subcomm. on Investigations Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 1 OOth Cong. 14 (1988) 
(statement of David C. Williams, Director, Office of Special Investigations) [hereinafter 
Investigations Comm. on Governmental Affairs]; see e.g., Accardo v. Comm'r, 942 F.2d 
444 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming the conviction of Anthony Accardo, a Chicago mob Boss, for 
tax evasion in the reporting of his criminal defense legal fees). For a complete accounting 
of Accordo's criminal record, which at his death included 27 arrests, but only the one, 
seemingly insignificant tax conviction, see Susan B. Bodell, Comment, Catching "Big 
Tuna": How the Seventh Circuit Finally Reeled in Anthony Accardo, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1061 (1993). 
3. Investigations Comm. on Governmental Affairs, supra note 2, at 14; see also United 
States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 683 F.Supp. 1411, 1445 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(proposing that the problem was compounded because "conviction and imprisonment of the 
perpetrators or organized crime were not sufficient to deter or curtail organized criminal 
activities since the incarcerated individuals were merely replaced with other members of the 
criminal enterprise while the economic base of the enterprise remained untouched."). 
4. See G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on 
Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249-80 (1982); see also G. Robert Blakey & 
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focus on "enterprise" criminality makes a single trial of all "siblings" in 
a crime "family" possible and appropriate. It forces a judge and jury to 
understand exactly what the defendants have done, in a way that the 
common law procedural and evidentiary rules did not. 
The success of RICO makes it an appealing model for other 
nations' legislation. In 2004, when the U.K. proposed law enforcement 
reforms with respect to organized crime, it looked to RICO. Its 
evaluation of the statute is largely innocent of the procedural and 
evidentiary considerations involved in effective prosecution of 
organized crime. 
This Article examines how RICO's substantive elements, namely 
"enterprise," "pattern," and "racketeering activity," shift the balance of 
power in a criminal prosecution by altering the application of 
procedural and evidentiary rules. Part I reviews the relevant procedural 
and evidentiary rules, as they existed before RICO and the advent of the 
"enterprise trial." Part II introduces RICO and examines how it 
changed the application of these rules, with particular focus on the law 
of joinder of offenses and offenders. Part III examines the law of 
joinder and severance in the U .K. where the primary paradigm for a trial 
is a lone defendant answering for a single offence. Part IV uses the 
recent U.K. ricin trial as a case study, demonstrating the need for a 
substantive offense to tie together loose-knit conspiracies and more 
effectively prosecute enterprise criminality like organized crime and 
terrorism. Finally, this Article concludes that RICO is successful partly 
because its substantive elements, namely "pattern," "enterprise," and 
"racketeering activity" interact with the procedural law to facilitate 
joinder of offenses and offenders. This Article suggests that our 
common law neighbors have missed an opportunity by failing to modify 
the structure of trials as part of the comprehensive criminal reform 
program. 
I. JOINDER AND SEVERANCE BEFORE RICO 
In order to understand the effect of the RICO revolution, it is first 
necessary to explore the American common law approaches to joinder 
of offenses and offenders before the advent of the criminal "enterprise 
trial." 
Kevin P. Roddy , Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on 
Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under RICO, 33 
AMERICAN CRIM. L. REV. 1345, 1666-75 (1996) (discussing the legislative history 
surrounding RICO). 
2
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2006], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol34/iss1/3
2006] A RICO Legal Structure for the United Kingdom 43 
A. Historical Approaches to Joinder 
Before the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the American 
common law controlled joinder and severance. 5 As a general practice, 
common law viewed a criminal trial as one defendant answering for a 
single offense. The decision to join offenses and offenders was placed 
within the discretionary authority of the judge. 6 In joining offenses, the 
judge weighed the utility of trying the offenses together "while 
conceding that regularly or usually an indictment should not include 
more than one felony. "7 A judge was not allowed to permit cases where 
multiple felonies were not of the same class or grade and subject to the 
same punishment. 8 In addition to this rather rigid rule of joinder, the 
prosecutor could only join offenses "when it appear[ ed] that they were 
so closely connected in respect to time, place, and occasion that it [was] 
difficult, if not impossible, to separate the proof of one from proof of 
the other."9 Joining two or more offenses is efficient because it 
prevents the needless repetition of evidence and witnesses that would 
occur if the offenses were tried separately. While efficiency was 
valued, judges in the 19th and early 20th Century were apprehensive of 
joinder because they feared that defending two counts at the same time 
would prejudice a defendant. Io A jury, even when properly instructed, 
5. United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 480 (1827) (holding that defendants 
do not have a right to be tried severally and separately). Justice Story, in deciding that 
joinder was proper, stated that "[t]he subject is not provided for by any act of Congress; and, 
therefore, if the right can be maintained at all, it must be as a right derived from the 
[English] common law, which the Courts of the Unites States are bound to recognize and 
enforce." Id. 
6. Pointer V. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 402 (1894) (quoting ARCHBOLD CRIMINAL 
PRACTICE AND PLEADING p.95 c.3 (8th ed.), where the Court states that "if different felonies 
or misdemeanors be stated in several counts of an indictment ... the judge, in his discretion, 
may require the counsel for the prosecutor to select one of the felonies, and confine himself 
to that." 
7. Pointer, 151 U.S. at 403. While joinder of the offenses, particularly felonies, was 
uncommon, U.S. Rev. Stat. § 1024 (1853) empowered the judge to join indictments of the 
same class of felony. In this case, the judge found that two murder charges arising from 
murders committed in the same county, with the same instrument (an axe), on the same day, 
were properly joined. Id. at 400. See also McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76, 81 (1896) 
(holding that it was beyond the judge's discretion to join defendants who had not 
participated in the same act or transaction). 
8. Pointer, 151 U.S. at 403; United States v. Nye, 4 F. 888 (1880) (finding separate and 
distinct felonies could not be joined but did not destroy the validity of the indictment). 
9. Pointer, 151 U.S. at 403. 
10. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) at 480; cf United States v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35, 36 
(2d Cir. 1939) (The joining of three charges of receiving commissions from borrowers from 
a national bank was within judge's discretion, where evidence as to each was short and 
simple); Kidwell v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 566, 570-71 (D.C. Cir. 1912) (improper 
joinder is overturned only for abuse of discretion). 
3
Gunnigle: "Birds of a Feather" Rico: Trying Partners In Crime Together
Published by SURFACE, 2006
44 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 34:41 
may use the evidence "cumulatively" and convict a defendant who, tried 
on one count, would have been acquitted. 11 Thus, there was a strong 
preference in the American common law for a simple trial unit. One 
offense and one offender remained the paradigm, and joinder was the 
exception, not the rule. 
A similar rule applied to joining defendants. The American 
common law rule was that persons charged in the same indictment 
"have not a right by the laws of the country, to be tried severally, 
separately, and apart . . . but that such separate trial is a matter to be 
allowed in the discretion of the Court before whom the indictment is 
tried." 12 Again, the courts favored the simplicity of a smaller trial. 
Joinder was restricted to defendants participating in the same offense or 
transaction. 13 For example, in McE/roy v. United States, Chief Justice 
Fuller ruled that the joinder of five defendants, who appeared to have 
formed an arson ring, was improper where all five members were 
charged with one arson and only three were charged with a second 
arson, which had occurred two weeks later. 14 This joinder was beyond 
the court's discretion because it "embarrassed" two of the defendants 
and "distracted" the jury. 15 Accordingly, the court reversed and granted 
new trials to two of the defendants. 16 
11. Lotsch, 102 F .2d at 36. Judge Learned Hand, in deciding that joinder was proper in 
the Lotsch case, articulated his concern that "[t]here is indeed always a danger when several 
crimes are tried together, that the jury may use the evidence cumulatively; that is, that, 
although so much as would be admissible upon any one of the charges might not have 
persuaded them of the accused's guilt, the sum of it will convince them as to all." Id. Joint 
trials are troubling when "the crimes charged are of such a nature that the jury might regard 
one as corroborative of the other, when, in fact, no corroboration exists." Kidwell, 38 App. 
D.C. at 570. The criticism of joint trials tends not to speak to the defendant's ability to 
defend two charges. Instead, they reveal a general distrust for the jury's ability to 
differentiate between defendants and offenses and intelligently apply the law to each. See 
e.g. United States v. Dinome, 954 F.2d 839, 842 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The claim that the jury 
must have lacked the capacity to understand the instructions given it is thus sheer 
speculation."). 
12. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 486 (1827). 
13. McElroy, 164 U.S. at 78 (1896). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 81. The court also noted that: 
[I]n cases of felony, the multiplication of distinct charges has been considered so 
objectionable as tending to confound the accused in his defence [sic], or to prejudice him as 
to his challenges, in the matter of being held out to be habitually criminal, in the distraction 
of the attention of the jury, or otherwise, that it is the settled rule in England and in many of 
our States, to confine the indictment to one distinct offence or restrict the evidence to one 
transaction. 
Id. at 80. 
16. Id. at 81. Generally, a joint trial could be unwound upon the showing that the 
"defendant was embarrassed or confounded in his defense." See also Pointer, 151 U.S. at 
4
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2006], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol34/iss1/3
2006] A RICO Legal Structure for the United Kingdom 45 
Typically, the law of joinder was not extended beyond its rationale. 
Before the Federal Rules, joinder was considered efficient because 
evidence against each defendant participating in the same offense would 
have been admissible against each defendant in a separate trial. Thus, 
joinder prevented the needless and redundant repetition of evidence. 17 
If, on the other hand, a trial consisted of diverse defendants and 
offenses, joinder was not proper because there would be no substantial 
overlap in the evidence against each. 18 The American common law 
approach to joinder worked to preserve the traditional paradigm of a 
simple trial. The rules of joinder of offenses and offenders limited the 
nature of the crimes joined and applied a "transactional" approach to 
joining defendants. 
B. Joinder and Severance after the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 1946-Present 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect March 21, 
1946.19 Rules 8 and 14, the rules that allow joinder2° and severance,21 
404. 
17. Nestlerode v. United States, 122 F.2d 56, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding that a 
motion for severance was properly denied where the close relation between the killings here 
makes much of the evidence pertinent to both). See also McNeil v. U.S., 85 F.2d 698, 703 
(D.C. Cir. 1936) (holding that in a trial for embezzlement and grand larceny, the trial court 
was correct in not putting the prosecutor to his election, because proof of one crime 
overlapped with proof of the other). See also Lee v. United States, 37 App. D.C. 442, 445 
(D.C. Cir. 1911) (holding that the proper joinder requires that the evidence of one of the 
crimes would have been admissible in a separate prosecution of the other). 
18. See McElroy, 164 U.S. at 78; see also text accompanying notes 13-16. 
19. FED. R. CRIM. P. 59. See also Jerold Israel, Federal Influence in State Cases: 
Sentencing, Prosecution, and Procedure: Federal Criminal Procedure as a Model for the 
States, 543 ANNALS 130, 142 (1996) (The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were 
adopted "at a propitious time." Their predecessor, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
was adopted in 1938, proving to be "a major triumph of law reform."). See also Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., Symposium: The 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
1938-1988, V. The Federal Rules Fifty Years Later: Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive 
Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1989) (When the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure came into force eight years later, court rules were still 
a recent innovation. They reflect the "then-prevailing view that the 'lawyer's law' of 
procedure should be set forth in a systematic fashion-rather than be developed haphazardly 
through case law-and should be promulgated by a body insulated from politics and advised 
by experts within the legal profession."). See also Israel, supra at 142 (The Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure contain ideas analogous to several Rules of Civil Procedure). Compare 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 ("These rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just determination of 
every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration, 
and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay") with FED. R. Clv. P. 1 (The rules "shall be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action."). 
20. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8. Rule 8 provides: 
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were designed ostensibly as a "substantial restatement of existing 
law."22 Like the previous American common law approach, the Rules 
allow joinder of offenses and offenders and grant the trial judge broad 
discretion to provide remedies. 23 
1. Joinder of Offenses Under the Federal Rules 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) allows a joint trial of 
offenses "of the same or similar character," "based on the same act or 
transaction," or "constituting parts of a common scheme of plan."24 For 
(a) Joinder of Offenses. The indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate 
counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged-whether felonies or misdemeanors 
or both-are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or 
are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. 
(b) Joinder of Defendants. The indictment or information may charge 2 or more defendants 
if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of 
acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses. The defendants may be charged in 
one or more counts together or separately. All defendants need not be charged in each 
count. 
Id. 
21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. Rule 14 provides for relieffromjudicialjoinder: 
(a) Relief. If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a 
consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may 
order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants' trials, or provide any other relief that 
justice requires. 
(b) Defendant's Statements. Before ruling on a defendant's motion to sever, the court may 
order an attorney for the government to deliver to the court for in camera inspection any 
defendant's statement that the government intends to use as evidence. 
Id. 
22. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a) Advisory Committee's notes. The Federal Rules purported to 
be a restatement of existing law. With respect to the law of joinder, the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure were innovative in their treatment of multiple defendants charged with 
multiple counts. The approach the second sentence of rule 8(b) "formulates a practice now 
approved in some circuits," but not the existing law in most circuits before the Federal 
Rules. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) Advisory Committee's notes (citing Caringella v. United 
States, 78 F.2d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 1935)). For additional instances where the Federal Rules 
were not the "substantial restatement of existing law" they purported to be, see supra text 
accompanying notes 30, 36. 
23. See, e.g., Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993) ("Rule 14 leaves the 
determination of risk of prejudice and any remedy that may be necessary to the sound 
discretion of the district courts."). 
24. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8. Joinder and severance are not mandatory under the Federal 
Rules. In some instances, the practical application of the rules may make joinder 
compulsory. The Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause may prohibit the prosecutor 
from bringing charges later that were not joined in the first trial. The relevant portion of the 
Fifth Amendment provides: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. To be considered the "same 
offense" for double jeopardy purposes, courts apply the Blockburger test that asks: "whether 
each [criminal] provision requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not." 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.299, 304 (1932). If the second offense does not 
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example, a defendant who recklessly operates a vehicle causing several 
deaths can be tried in one trial for all of the offenses arising from his 
conduct. Likewise, actions that are close in time and space, like 
successive shots from a firearm causing multiple deaths, are properly 
joined under the rule. Events that are separated by substantial space and 
time, but that constitute part of a common scheme can also be properly 
joined. For example, a defendant who commits two bank robberies, one 
as a "training mission" for the second, can properly be tried under the 
rule because the robberies were part of the common scheme. 25 
The modem rational for joining offenses into a single trial is that 
joinder furthers judicial efficiency. A single trial eliminates the 
needless overlap of witnesses and evidence that would occur if the 
offenses were separately litigated. A joint trial can diminish delays in 
the criminal justice system, reduce the inconveniences to witnesses and 
police, and conserve funds. It is for these reasons that the federal court 
system favors joinder.26 A joint trial is not solely for the benefit of the 
Government. Defending a single trial is often preferable for the 
Defendant, who realizes a mentally exhaustive and monetarily draining 
trial and appeal process. A joint trial can also facilitate concurrent 
sentencing, which can be to the defendant's advantage. 
Nevertheless, joinder of offenses often comes at the cost of real 
and perceived prejudice. The Federal Rules balance the value of 
accurate and fair outcomes with the necessity for timely and final 
decisions by providing for severance. For example, Rule 14 provides 
that a judge may sever the trial or provide other relief if prejudice 
occurs.27 Severing the trial is a rare and extreme measure. The more 
common relief is a limiting instruction in which the judge directs the 
require proof of an addition fact, it cannot be brought in a separate trial. Thus, there is an 
incentive for the prosecutor to join all offenses arising from the same facts or risk losing the 
convictions. See also, Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970) (holding that the issue 
preclusion doctrine prohibits the government from relitigating "an issue of ultimate fact that 
has been determined by a valid and final judgment"), but see Dowling v. United States, 493 
U.S. 342, 349 ( 1990) (limiting Ashe to instances where the government had the same burden 
or proof as to a particular issue in both trials). For a summary of the double jeopardy 
challenges that RICO has survived, see U.S. Dept. of Justice, Criminal Div., Organized 
Crime and Racketeering Section, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations: A 
Manual for Federal Prosecutors 246 (4th ed. 2000). 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 973 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the 
"training mission" and the second robbery were part of the same common scheme). 
26. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993) ("Joint trials 'play a vital role 
in the criminal justice system."' (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987)). 
Justice O'Connor went on to state that the joint trial system "promoted efficiency and served 
the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts." Id. 
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14, supra note 21 (quoting Rule 14 in full). 
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jury as to which evidence it should consider as part of each offense. 28 A 
limiting instruction places faith in the jury's ability to distinguish the 
evidence intelligently and apply the law as to each offence. Depending 
on the number of offenses joined and the complexity of the evidence, 
this may be no easy task for the jury. 
The jury is asked to consider evidence that might not be admissible 
if the trials were severed. Take for example, a defendant accused of two 
robberies. The robberies occurred within two weeks and ten miles of 
each other and were committed by a man with a dark suntan who was 
wearing sunglasses. 29 The two robberies could properly be joined under 
the language of Rule 8 because the robberies were "of the same or 
similar character. "30 The prosecutor must introduce evidence as to each 
offense and prove each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In a 
separate trial, evidence of the second robbery could not be admitted 
unless it tended to show identity, plan, or otherwise fell into the narrow 
category of exceptions prescribed by the Rules of Evidence.31 When the 
offenses are of a "garden variety," and present no particularity from 
which the jury could draw the inference of identity, the second robbery 
28. See FED. R. CRIM. P.14 construed in US.NITA Commentary, FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. 
29. This is slight variation on the facts of Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 94 (D.C. 
Cir. 1964). There, the defendant was charged with robbery and an attempted robbery. Id. 
After a detailed examination of Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), the court held that 
because evidence of one robbery would not have been admissible under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence if the offenses had been tried separately, and because the prosecution occasionally 
failed to distinguish between the two robberies, the defendant's motion to sever was 
improperly denied. Id. The Drew court endorsed a test that the evidence must be 
sufficiently "simple and distinct" to mitigate the dangers otherwise created by such a 
joinder. Id. at 93. Further, joining offenses creates a special burden on the counsel. If 
separate offenses are "to be tried together, both court and counsel must recognize that they 
are assuming a difficult task the performance of which calls for a vigilant precision in 
speech and action far beyond that required in the ordinary trial." Id. at 94. 
30. Id. at 93. The "of similar character" language of the rule was a controversial issue 
in the Advisory Committee. It originally read "of similar class" and was designed to restate 
the federal statute that allowed judges to join felonies. The most vigorous dissenter to this 
rule was Robert F. Maguire. Robert F. Maguire, Proposed New Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 23 OR. L. REv. 56, 58 (1943). 
31. FED. R. Evm. 404(b) provides that: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of 
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or 
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general 
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
FED. R. Evm. 404(b ). 
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would be inadmissible character evidence.32 The Rules of Evidence 
presuppose that a jury, when faced with multiple offenses against a 
single defendant, will infer that the defendant has a propensity for 
criminal action and convict on bad character alone. Commentators have 
argued, with varying degrees of success, that Rule 8( a) should be 
construed in tandem with the Federal Rules of Evidence and that joinder 
is proper only when the evidence would be admissible if the charges 
were tried separately.33 
2. The Joinder of Offenders under the Federal Rules 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b) allows for joinder of 
defendants "if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or 
transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an 
offense or offenses." 34 For example, a defendant charged with a 
narcotics violation and a defendant charged with arson and mail fraud 
could not be joined unless the government could show that acts are 
connected as part of the "same series of acts."35 In one respect, Rule 
8(b) is a narrow rule that, unlike Rule 8(a), does not allow defendants to 
be joined if their offenses are of the same or similar character or arose 
out of a common scheme. On the other hand, the last two sentences of 
8(b) represent a more expansive role of joinder than was permitted at 
common law in most jurisdictions.36 Rule 8(b) goes on to state that: 
"[t]he defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or 
separately. All defendants need not be charged in each count." 37 These 
32. Drew, 331 F.2d at 90. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 490 F. Supp. 373, 375 
(S.D. Ga. 1980) (evidence of other crimes is admissible to show plan, identity and 
preparation); Commonwealth v. Morris, 425 A.2d 715, 720-21 (Pa. 1981) (deciding under a 
similar state law that while the evidence could be used to draw the inference of criminal 
disposition, it was inadmissible to show a modus operandi); State v. Romero, 634 P.2d 954, 
956-57 (Ariz. 1981) (finding that under a similar state rule, evidence of other crimes is 
admissible to show identity). 
33. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using a Contextual Construction to Resolve the 
Dispute over the Meaning of the Term "Plan" in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 43 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1005, 1020 (1995) (arguing that the word "plan" in Rule 8, which excludes 
"unlinked" plans comprised of diverse, unrelated offenses, was used to mean the same thing 
in rule 404(b)). 
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). For the full text of the rule, see supra note 20. 
35. The example in the text is based in part on the indictment in Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 
( 1981 ). See infra notes and text 67-81. If the government could prove a conspiracy to 
commit narcotics offenses and arson, joinder would be proper. See e.g., United States v. 
Castellano, 610 F.Supp. 1359, 1396 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[C]onspiracy presumptively satisfies 
Rule 8(a)."). 
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b), Advisory Committee's notes. 
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b); see supra note 20 (quoting Rule 8 in full). 
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two sentences effectively overturn the restrictive rule in cases like 
McElroy and recognized a growing judicial trend toward joinder in 
cases where all defendants were not charged with identical crimes. 
The rule of joinder is not of constitutional magnitude. 38 It can, 
however, raise constitutional questions, particularly when a confession 
is involved. In a joint trial, when one defendant confesses, the 
confession may contain inculpating references to other co-defendants. 
If the confessing defendant chooses not to testify at trial, the co-
defendants are left unable to cross-examine the evidence against them. 
The use of this kind of confession in a joint trial violates the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause. 39 Even with a limiting instruction 
(i.e., informing the jury that the confession is only admissible against 
the confessing defendant), the use of the confession is barred.40 This 
rule, otherwise termed the Bruton problem, does not bar joinder of 
accomplices, but it imposes a significant cost for joinder. The 
prosecutor could eliminate all references to all other co-defendants,41 try 
the defendants separately, or not use the confession at all. In cases 
where many defendants are properly joined, this can be particularly 
problematic. In large cases, theoretically, the probability of confessions 
should increase because of the reduced protection of one's own 
silence.42 
38. Lane v. United States, 474 U.S. 438, 445 (1986) (holding that a proper limiting 
instruction can resolve the prejudice of a misjoined count against a defendant). 
39. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The Sixth Amendment reads, in full: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
40. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136. 
41. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1983) (limiting the Bruton rule to 
instances where the co-defendant is directly referred to in the confession; confessions which 
link a co-defendant to the crime if viewed in light of all the other evidence is admissible). 
But see Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185,186-87 (1998) (holding that the redacting the co-
defendant's name from the confession could not eliminate direct incrimination because the 
jury will often realize that the redaction refers specifically to the co-defendant). 
42. See J .R. LUCAS, RESPONSIBILITY 69-72 ( 1993 ). The "Prisoners Dilemma" suggests 
a scenario where two prisoners are accused of a serious crime. The prosecution does not 
have enough evidence to convict either on the serious crime; however, they have enough to 
convict each on a minor crime. The prosecution attempts plea-bargaining with each, 
offering a pardon for both the major and minor crime in exchange for testimony securing the 
conviction of the other. Each prisoner has a strong incentive to confess, but in acting 
selfishly, both defendants will end up worse than if neither confessed. If both confess, they 
will receive a long sentence for pleading guilty to a major crime. By keeping silent, they 
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Even when joinder is proper, a judge may order a severance under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14. Rule 14 states that defendants 
and offenses may be severed if a joint trial would prejudice either a 
defendant or the government.43 As at the American common law, the 
Federal Rules place the decision to sever a trial squarely within the trial 
judge's discretion. A defendant seeking severance under Rule 14 bears 
the heavy burden of establishing that prejudice would result from his 
joinder with other defendants. As the Supreme Court announced in 
Zafiro v. United States, even if potential prejudice can be shown, "Rule 
14 does not require severance ... ; rather, it leaves the tailoring of the 
relief to be granted, if any, to the district court's sound discretion."44 
Often, the given relief comes in the form of a limiting instruction. 
Severance should be granted "only if there is a serious risk that a joint 
trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or 
prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or 
innocence. "45 
Courts have refused to adopt bright line rules in this area. For 
example, in trials where defendants are properly joined only because of 
an overarching conspiracy count and the conspiracy count fails for lack 
of proof, courts are loath to sever the trials or grant new trials upon 
review.46 This is because courts have opted for the flexible standard of 
"substantial prejudice" rather than a rigid rule.47 After Zafiro, judges 
read Rule 14 to tolerate some prejudice in its application.48 Courts have 
may only be convicted of the lesser offense. Id. The incentive to confess becomes greater 
as more defendants are joined. Each added defendant increases the other defendants' 
apprehension that someone will confess and thus implicate all of them. Acting to maximize 
pay-off, defendants in large trials may confess more readily. The Bruton problem does not 
arise in this scenario unless the confessor refuses to testify at trial. Alternatively, a co-
defendant's testimony may exculpate a defendant. Because the co-defendant may not wish 
to waive his Fifth Amendment right and testify at trial, the exculpatory testimony will not be 
heard. In this respect joinder acts to silence the witnesses that may be the most helpful to 
the defendants case. Id. For a classical explanation of this problem, see Peter Westen, The 
Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. LR.Ev. 73, 143 (1974); Russell D. Covey, Beating 
the Prisoner at the Prisoner's Dilemma: The Evidentiary Value of a Witness's Refusal to 
Testify, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 105 (1997). 
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14; see supra note 21 (quoting Rule 14 in full). 
44. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538-40 (1993). 
45. Id. 
46. See, e.g., Shaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 516 (1960). 
47. See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 445 (1986). 
48. Whether or not this application is beneficial is subject to some debate. Tolerating 
some prejudice places considerable faith in the jury's ability to differentiate between 
defendants and the proof offered of each offense. The ruling in Shaffer also seems to allow 
an unscrupulous prosecutor to allege a conspiracy without any proof and reap all of the 
benefits of joinder. Justice Douglas argued against this result that "allow[s] conspiracy to 
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held that a showing that a defendant would have a better chance of 
acquittal if tried alone is not sufficient to order a severance.49 Mutually 
antagonist defenses alone are not enough to mandate severance. 50 
Additionally, the trial judge's decision to join defendants is subject to 
review only for abuse of discretion, making joinder a difficult, if not 
impossible, decision to win on appeal. 51 
II. JOINDER AND RICO: THE ENTERPRISE TRIAL 
Joinder under the Federal Rules is more liberal than it was under 
the American common law. Both methods, however, aim for a 
relatively simple trial of defendants related in the same transaction. 
RICO functions within the framework of the Federal Rules as a joinder 
mechanism, allowing joinder of defendants and offenses beyond what 
would be permitted under the Federal Rules in the context of predicate 
offenses standing alone. The RICO "enterprise" supplies the 
connection between superficially unrelated defendants committing 
diverse crimes and allows the group to be prosecuted in a single trial. 
A. The RICO Statute 
Congress enacted RICO in 1970 as part of the Organized Crime 
Control Act.52 RICO has proven to be an adaptive statutory scheme. It 
encompasses both criminal activity that infiltrates legitimate businesses 
and criminal activity that conducts itself in a business-like manner. 
The statute defines a complex crime, in some ways akin to 
conspiracy in that group crime is targeted and the commission of a 
"predicate" crime is involved. But RICO accomplishes more than 
traditional conspiracy law. It strikes at the organization itself, through 
be put to new and dangerous uses when we sanction the practice observed here." Shaffer, 
362 U.S. at 534. Yet a bright line rule that provides mandatory severance when the claims 
that facilitate joinder fail may have an inapposite effect. Courts balancing efficiency versus 
the risk of prejudice have firmly put their thumb on efficiency. Thus, such a bright line rule 
may deter the judge from dismissing a conspiracy charge at the cost of severing the 
defendants' trials and rehearing the evidence in each case. Thus, perhaps the more sensible 
determination is the one the court in Shaffer made. 
49. Zajiro, 506 U.S. at 540. 
50. Id. at 542. 
51. UNITA commentary, supra note 28; see id. at 541-42. 
52. As such, RICO was one element of a comprehensive effort to "seek the eradication 
of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-
gathering-process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced 
sanctions and new remedies." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 
84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970); Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A 
Response to Gerard E. Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774 (1988). 
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the individuals who affect or are affected by it.53 Before RICO's 
enactment, members of a criminal syndicate could only be prosecuted 
individually or as part of a conspiracy. Using RICO, the government 
can prosecute individuals employed by or associated with a criminal 
enterprise, forming one criminal "enterprise trial" and prosecuting a 
wide scope of criminality because RICO's predicate offenses are 
themselves diverse. 54 
In brief, 18 U.S.C. §1962(c), RICO's core prohibition, makes it a 
crime for a person to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt. 55 The 
53. Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E. 
Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 774, 775 (1988). Goldsmith explains: 
Id. 
Congress recognized that previous efforts against organized crime had failed 
because the focus had been on individual prosecutions rather than on organizational 
foundations. Since the structure and strength of organized crime transcend its 
membership, criminal enterprises could thrive despite successful individual 
prosecutions. Reform, therefore, was aimed at the enterprise itself-both directly 
and through the means by which organizational control was often acquired. 
54. G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett 
v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 250 n. 151 , 299 n.165 (1982). 
55. RICO,§ 1962, provides in full: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, 
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of 
an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the 
meaning of§ 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, 
any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any 
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, 
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of 
securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention 
of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to 
do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held 
by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices 
in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such 
purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities 
of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or 
more directors of the issuer. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, 
any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of 
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 
( c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such 
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of 
unlawful debt. 
( d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of 
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. 
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2004). 
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terms "enterprise," "pattern," and "racketeering activity" are not 
traditional or common law concepts, but they are drafted in terms of 
common law elements as well as statutory constructs. 56 An enterprise, 
as defined by section 1961 ( 4 ), "includes any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. "57 Likewise, 
section 1961 ( 1) defines "racketeering activity" roughly as ( 1) a crime of 
violence, (2) provision of illegal goods and services, (3) corruption in 
government or labor unions, or (4) commercial fraud.58 Acts of 
"racketeering activity" become a "pattern" when they are "continu[ ous] 
and relat[ed]," rather than "isolated" or "sporadic."59 
RICO, like any offense, can be broken down into person, conduct, 
surrounding circumstances, result, and corresponding states of mind. 60 
The persons subject to RICO are limited to those "employed by or 
associated with" the enterprise. In order to violate RICO the person 
must conduct (or participate) through "racketeering activity" and that 
conduct must form a "pattern."61 
To violate section 1962( c ), the surrounding circumstances must 
Read together, each section (a)-(d) builds on the next, establishing multiple ways to violate 
the RICO statute. Each section provides remedies that are cumulative and not mutually 
exclusive. Section ( c ), the "core" provision, is the most sophisticated and complex violation 
of RICO. Subsections (a) and (b) supplement (but do not supplant) the prohibitions of 
subsection (c). They provide additional ways of violating RICO's core provision, by 
"investment and use" or "acquisition and maintenance" of the enterprise. On the other hand, 
subsection 1962( d) is an "inchoate" version of each of the other prohibitions. Its violation 
contemplates, but does not require, a substantive violation of the Section. Thus, taken 
together, as they must be, the subsections of§ 1962 - the prohibition provisions of RICO 
- provide a rich variety of ways to violate RICO, and it subsections fully cover the wide 
range of roles (e.g., "perpetrator," "victim," "prize," and "instrument") involved in RICO 
violations - by, through, and against an "enterprise." See generally, Thomas O'Neill, 
Note, Functions of the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 646 (1989) 
[hereinafter RICO Enterprise Concept]. 
56. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 149-50 
(1987) ("RICO is designed to remedy injury caused by a pattern of racketeering, and 
concepts such as RICO 'enterprise' and 'pattern of racketeering activity' were simply 
unknown to common law.") (internal citations omitted). 
57. 18 u.s.c. § 1961(4). 
58. Blakey, supra note 54, at 300-06. 
59. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); see infra notes 73-87 and 
accompanying text. 
60. G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflection on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its 
Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability 
Under RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L REV. 1345, 1666-75 (1996); G. Robert Blakey & Brian 
Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 
BYU L. REV 829, 1044-50 (2002). 
61. The pattern requirement is discussed infra Part II( C). 
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show a connection between RICO's key elements, "enterprise," 
"pattern," and "racketeering activity." Specifically, the government 
must prove: 1) the existence of the enterprise, 2) the defendant's 
employment by or association with the enterprise, 3) the pattern of 
racketeering activity, 4) the conduct of the enterprise's affairs "through" 
the pattern, and 5) the enterprise's effect on interstate or foreign 
commerce. 62 In addition to these existing circumstances, the 
substantive offense also incorporates the existing circumstances that are 
required to commit the predicate racketeering acts. RICO does not 
require a result beyond that required of the predicate acts. That is to 
say, the statute does not require that any particular event be caused by 
the surrounding circumstances. While the substantive offense might 
require a "result," RICO does not under section 1962(c).63 
Nothing on the face of RICO indicates a mens rea requirement 
beyond that of the predicate offense. When a statute does not prescribe 
a mental element, one may be read into the statute consistent with 
legislative intent. 64 Traditionally, if a criminal statute is not merely 
regulatory, a mens rea requirement is required.65 Absent a contrary 
intent, courts read the conduct requirement to require a "knowing" state 
of mind. 66 In addition, the defendant must "know" of the surrounding 
circumstances. This is with the exception of RICO's jurisdictional 
requirement that the enterprises have an affect on interstate commerce. 
The government need not prove state of mind as to the effect of the 
enterprise's activities on commerce. 67 
B. RICO as a Joinder Mechanism 
The "heart beat" of the RICO statute is the "enterprise."68 The 
enterprise concept allows joinder of defendants and offenders 
62. Nancy L. Ickler, Note, Conspiracy to Violate RICO: Expanding Traditional 
Conspiracy Law, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 607-08 (1983). 
63. But cf 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (b) (requiring acquisition or maintenance as an element of 
the offense). 
64. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403-09 (1980). See also United States v. 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978) ("Certainly far more than the simple omission of the 
appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with the 
intent requirement."). 
65. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 258-59 (1952) (scienter required for 
common law offenses, but not regulatory offenses). 
66. Blakey & Murray, supra note 60. 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 679 (1975) (holding that knowledge 
of the facts giving rise to federal jurisdiction is not necessary for conviction of a substantive 
offense embodying a mens rea requirement). 
68. See RICO Enterprise Concept, supra note 55, at 646. 
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"employed by or associated with" an enterprise or "who conspire to 
violate section 1962(c)."69 The enterprise concept is an overarching 
element that, like conspiracy, can satisfy the requirements of Federal 
Rule 8(b ). The "enterprise" connects superficially unrelated defendants 
who may not otherwise have been joined. The scope of the trial is thus 
highly dependant on how the prosecutor defines the "enterprise." 
A RICO enterprise is defined as "include[ing] any individual, 
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any 
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal 
entity." 7° Congress chose to define enterprise broadly, using the word 
"include[ ing]" to indicate that individuals, partnerships, and 
corporations are words of illustration; 71 enterprises existing beyond the 
foresight of the drafters may be within the scope of the definition. 
Courts applying this language have found private businesses, labor 
organizations, non-profit organizations, marriages, government offices 
and other "associations in fact" to be an "enterprise" within the statutory 
definition of the word. 72 Despite the broad definition of "enterprise" 
and a congressional direction that RICO "shall be liberally construed to 
effectuate its remedial purposes,"73 over ten years after the passage of 
RICO, there remained questions concerning the scope of the term 
"enterprise."74 In order to see the practical effect of the RICO 
69. 
70. 18 U.S.C. §1961(4) (2004). For an excellent history of the court's interpretation of 
"association in fact," see Paul Edgar Howard, Note, Quo Vadis, Association in Fact? The 
Growing Disparity Between How Federal Courts Interpret RICO 's Enterprise Provision in 
Criminal and Civil Cases (With Little Statutory Background to Explain Why), 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 781, 801 (2005). 
71. United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1991). 
72. RICO Enterprise Concept, supra note 55, at 654-56. 
73 . Pub. Law. No. 91-452, § 9.4(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970). RICO, like the antitrust 
statutes on which it was modeled, uses "a generality and adaptability [of language] 
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions." Appalachian Coals, 
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1993). RICO was drafted "broadly enough to 
encompass a wide range of criminal activity, taking many forms, and likely to attract a 
broad array of perpetrators operating in many different ways." H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern 
Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S 229, 248-49 (1989). The court in H.J, Inc. stated that "[t]he 
occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to combat organized crime. But 
Congress, for cogent reasons, chose to enact a more general statute." Id. Thus, like the 
antitrust statutes, "RICO is to be read broadly." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 
479, 497-98 (1984). 
74. See United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that illegitimate 
enterprises were beyond the ambit of the RICO statute based on the legislative intent), rev 'd 
en bane, 634 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980). See also United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 
1330 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984) ("enterprise criminality" consists 
of "all types of organized criminal behavior [ranging] from simple political corruption to 
sophisticated white collar crime schemes to mafia-type endeavors.") (citations omitted). 
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enterprise as a joinder mechanism, it is necessary to consider cases 
where the court held that "enterprises" did not extend to "illegitimate 
enterprises." 
1. Turkette: The Magna Carta of RICO Prosecutions 
The Turkette case involved a nine-count indictment that charged 
thirteen men with conspiracy to conduct and participate in the affairs of 
an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through a pattern of 
racketeering activity. 75 The only common thread in the nine-count 
indictment was defendant Turkette' s alleged leadership in the criminal 
organization. 76 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that 
because the alleged enterprise was wholly criminal in nature, it was not 
an "enterprise" within the meaning of the RICO statute.77 When the 
Defendants in RICO litigation often question whether RICO applies beyond "organized 
crime" in the Mafia sense of the word, as if "white-collar crime" were not sometimes 
"organized." To be sure, "a" "purpose of RICO" was to combat "organized crime," but that 
specific purpose was not its "only" purpose. "[A]lthough the legislative history of RICO 
vividly demonstrates that it was primarily enacted to combat organized crime, nothing in 
that history, or in the language of the statute itself, expressly limits RICO' s use to members 
of organized crime." Owl Constr. Co., Inc. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 
540, 542 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Uni Oil Inc., 646 F.2d 946, 953 (5th Cir. 
1981 )). "[C]ommentators have persuasively and exhaustively explained why the statute 
[does] not require [such a showing]." Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, RICO fits well 
into the typical pattern of Federal legislation aimed at a particular problem, but drafted in 
all-purpose language. 
The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (criminal sanctions) and 42 U.S.C. § 
1981, et seq. (civil sanctions)) is a classic example of this type of legislation. Congress 
specifically aimed the 1871 Act at the depredations of the Klan in the South after the Civil 
War, but under the Act, its criminal and civil sanctions apply to "any person" who deprives 
another of civil rights guaranteed under the Constitution or other Federal law. It equally 
applies today, for example, to the unlawful conduct of police officers, as in the infamous 
Rodney King incident in Los Angeles. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) 
("[The KKK Act is] cast in general language and is applicable to Illinois as it is the States 
whose names were mentioned over and again in the debates."), overruled on other grounds, 
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Koon v. United States, 518 
U.S. 81, 85-88 (1996) (reviewing the facts of the prosecution of the Los Angeles police 
officer under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for the beating of Rodney King). King subsequently obtained 
a $3.8 million settlement on his civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Charles 
LeDuff, 12 Years After the Riots, Rodney King Gets Along, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, at 
18. 
75. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 578-79 (1981 ). 
76. Id. at 579. 
77. Compare United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 
576 (1980) (holding that the defendants were all entitled to new trials because joinder was 
entirely prejudicial when the RICO counts failed) with United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 
(holding that, when the RICO count failed because the enterprise was wholly criminal in 
nature, all defendants were entitled to a new trial because of prejudicial misjoinder). 
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RICO claim failed, the joinder of each of the defendants became 
improper, and thus, each defendant was granted a new trial. 
The Supreme Court in Turkette rejected this interpretation of RICO 
as inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. 78 The statute, on 
its face, contains no limitation on it application to illegitimate 
enterprises. Had Congress intended to include such a limitation, "it 
could have easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting 
a single word: 'legitimate. "'79 
The definition of enterprise in section 1961 ( 4) includes two 
categories: partnerships, corporations and other "legal entities; and "any 
union or group of individuals associated in fact."80 The Court rejected 
the use of the ejusdem generis doctrine to read the statute as if 
"associations in fact" was merely a more general description of the first 
category of legitimate enterprises.81 Instead, "associations in fact" is a 
"separate type of enterprise to be covered by the statute."82 
This reading of RICO does not create the internal inconsistencies 
of which the Circuit Court opined. 83 Including illegitimate associations 
in the definition of an "enterprise" does not merge the "pattern of 
racketeering" with the concept of "enterprise." The existence of the 
"enterprise" is a separate requirement which can be satisfied by 
"evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by 
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. "84 
The "pattern of racketeering" is a series of offenses prescribed by 
statute in section 1961(1).85 While the proof of the "enterprise" and the 
78. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-81 ("In determining the scope of a statute, we first look to 
its language."). 
79. Id. 
80. 18 U.S.C. §1961 (4) (2004). 
81. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581. 
82. Id. at 582. 
83. Id. at 582-583. The Turkette went on to state that: 
If "a pattern of racketeering" can itself be an "enterprise" for the purposes of section 
1962( c ), then the two phrases "employed by or associated with any enterprise" and 
"the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through [a pattern ofracketeering activity]" 
add nothing to the meaning of the section. The words of the statute are coherent and 
logical only if they are read as applying to legitimate enterprises. 
Id. at 582. 
84. Id. at 579, 583. The Court found sufficient government allegations that the 
enterprise consisted of a "group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of illegally 
trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs, committing arsons, utilizing the United 
States mails to defraud insurance companies, bribing and attempting to bribe local police 
officers, and corruptly influencing and attempting to corruptly influence the outcome of 
state court proceedings." Id. at 579. 
85. Id. at 583. The "pattern of racketeering activity" is not as easily determined as the 
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"pattern of racketeering activity" ma~ overlap, that does not mean that 
the requirements are one in the same. 6 
Lastly, the Court rejected an argument that the interpretation of 
RICO to include illegitimate enterprises would substantially enlarge the 
federal jurisdiction into criminal law enforcement, an area of traditional 
state control. 87 Even if RICO does change the balance of criminal 
enforcement, "Congress was well aware that it was entering a new 
domain of federal involvement through the enactment of this 
measure."88 The Court found sufficient evidence in the legislative 
record to suggest that Congress purposefully moved to change this 
balance, because existing state and federal laws were inadequate to 
address the growing problem of organized crime. 89 
a. Proving the Enterprise 
The Court in Turkette set down the rule that the existence of 
racketeering activity and enterprise are distinct elements of RICO. The 
"enterprise" can be proved by "evidence of an ongoing organization," 
and by "evidence that the various associates function as a continuing 
unit. "90 In instances where the alleged enterprise is a corporation or a 
partnership, the enterprise element is satisfied by proof of the 
organization's legal existence.91 Where the enterprise is an association 
in fact, often the proof will be more difficult. A prosecutor may want to 
introduce expert evidence of the family structure of organized crime, 
their terminology, and modus operandi to help prove the existence of an 
enterprise. 92 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert is allowed to offer 
testimony that will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue."93 For example, a RICO prosecution may 
court in Turkette lets on. See notes and text supra Part Il(c ). 
86. "While proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases 
coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish the other." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. 
87. Id. at 586. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 583. 
91. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581-82. 
92. Teresa Bryan et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 40 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 987, 997 n.73 (2003); U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 24, at 277. 
93 . Federal Rule of Evidence 702 reads in full: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient 
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want to introduce explanations of organized crime structure and the 
jargon of the leadership hierarchy (i.e.: "capo," "captain," or "crew"). 
In United States v. Daly, the expert testimony of an FBI agent was 
admitted, outlining the structure of the Gambino crime family, with 
whom the defendants were allegedly associated. The agent described 
the method by which the family had gained control over certain labor 
unions in the New York City area.94 As part of his testimony, the agent 
identified labor unions, officials, and members of the crime family who 
appeared on surveillance tapes admitted against all of the defendants. 
The agent's testimony was "relevant to provide the jury with an 
understanding of the nature and structure of organized crime families" 
because "[t]here is no question that there was much that was outside the 
expectable realm of knowledge of the average juror."95 The courts in 
applying this rule admit the background expert testimony and allow the 
jury to consider such evidence as "proof of th[ e] overall continuing 
enterprise. "96 
Admission of background testimony relevant to the general nature 
of mob families has been able to withstand a challenge based on Rule 
703, the Bases of Opinion by Experts. This rule provides, in part, that 
the facts or data relied upon by the expert, "if of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field ... , do not need to be admissible 
into evidence" in order to allow the expert opinion to be admitted. 97 
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the 
case. 
FED. R. Evm. 702. 
94. United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1388 (2d Cir. 1988). 
95. Id. at 1388. The Daly court was not entirely faithful to the text of Rule 702. The 
rule does not require a showing that the expert testimony consists of information beyond the 
expertise of the jury; it does, however, require that the information "assist" the jury in 
understanding the evidence. FED. R. Evm. 702, supra note 93. 
96. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1389. 
97. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 reads in full: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or 
data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the 
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative 
value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs 
their prejudicial effect. 
FED. R. Evm. 703. 
The Federal Rule altered the common law restrictions on the facts and data an expert may 
rely on in forming his opinion. The expert's reasonable reliance tended to weigh in favor of 
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The Advisory Committee notes explain that a physician in his practice 
forms a diagnosis based on numerous sources: test results, statements by 
the patient and relatives, and the opinion of other doctors.98 Most of 
these sources would be admissible, but only at the cost of considerable 
time at trial and cost of production. Yet, the doctor can make a life or 
death decision in reliance upon these sources. Thus, the doctor's expert 
opinion "expertly performed and subject to cross examination, ought to 
suffice for judicial purposes."99 
In the context of a RICO trial, the "reasonable reliance" 
requirement of Rule 703 can be an ambiguous term. The government 
agents testifying to the nature and organization of the mob have relied 
on countless, nameless informers to form their understanding. In 
addition, they rely on thousands of hours of wiretaps and prior trial 
testimony of mob turncoats. These statements are inadmissible hearsay, 
yet, under the rule, if of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
the field, the expert opinion based upon them is admissible. One 
wonders if this is the sort of information that the drafters of the Rules of 
Evidence envisioned being admitted under Rule 703. The FBI agent 
testifying in these trials can hardly be said to be making "life or death" 
decisions when formulating a mental glossary of mob vernacular. 
Furthermore, the "reasonableness" of the agent's reliance could be 
questioned. Informants are creatures of the underworld themselves and 
thus of questionable credibility. Allowing informant information into 
the trial in this way can invite untrustworthy testimony without giving 
the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the informant. On the 
other hand, there may not be a more knowledgeable (or reasonable) 
source than an informant whose life and livelihood revolve around such 
customs and vernacular. Accordingly, the courts have been not been 
receptive to challenges to the expert's opinion based on informant 
hearsay statements. 100 The "liberal thrust" of the federal rules grants the 
the evidence's "particular trustworthiness," which satisfied the Confrontation Clause. Ohio 
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not allow 
admission of hearsay testimony if the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination, unless 
the statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability," which can be inferred if "the evidence 
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or exhibits "particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness"). Whether this exception survived Crawford is now the subject of some 
debate. See generally Ross A. Oliver, Note, Testimonial Hearsay as the Basis for Expert 
Opinion: The Intersection of the Confrontation Clause and the Federal Rule of Evidence 
703 After Crawford v. Washington, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1539 (2004). 
98. FED. R. Evm. 703. Advisory Committee's note. 
99. Id. 
100. United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Salemo, 
868 F.2d 524, 534-536 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1387-88 (2d 
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judge "authority and discretion to determine whether novel scientific 
evidence is trustworthy." 101 Additionally, the expert evidence is subject 
to cross-examination and the broad language of Rule 403. 
Federal Rule 403 provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may 
be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by the 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence."102 This limitation works together with the 
notion of relevance to provide a sliding scale of what evidence will be 
admitted. 103 Even information in newspapers relating to mob 
connections, where it was not used by the prosecutor in the trial, if it 
comes to the attention of the jury-or might have come to the attention 
of a jury-it resulted in granting a new trial in litigation prior to RICO. 
104 The stereotypes surrounding organized crime are so damaging that 
judges feared that if the jury read or might have read such an article, 
they would be inclined to convict on bad character alone, rather than 
forming an impartial assessment of the defendant's guilt. 105 Thus, mere 
publicity surrounding the trial can become grounds for a mistrial if the 
trial court does not take a prompt and effective corrective action to cure 
the taint of such reports. 106 
The substantive element of a RICO charge changes the application 
of Rule 403 with respect to the admission of evidence concerning a 
defendant's organized crime connections. Where the alleged enterprise 
charged is a crime family, evidence that the defendant was "employed 
by or associated with" the family is an essential element of the 
charge. 107 If the enterprise is a "crew," a branch of a crime family, the 
prosecutor can refer to the larger crime family to establish the crew.108 
"In RICO cases, courts have refused to strike allegations of organized 
Cir. 1988). 
101. United States v. Losascio, 6 F.3d 924, 938 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). 
102. FED. R. Evrn. 403. 
103. Id. at Advisory Committee's note. 
104. United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133, 133 (7th Cir. 1962) (holding that 
"separation of jury, exposing it to newspaper publicity prejudicial to defendant, denied him 
fair trial, despite judge's admonition at voir dire, in absence of frequent, specific 
admonitions with reference to newspaper accounts"); cf United States v. Gigante, 729 F.2d 
78, 84 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding newspaper articles about the mob that would be generally 
prejudicial were admissible to prove the reasonableness of the fear of a certain loan shark). 
105. Accardo, 298 F.2d at 139 (Duffy, J., concurring). 
106. Id. at 136 (majority opinion). 
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2004). 
108. United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1011-12 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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crime connections [when they] 'serve to identify the "enterprise" and 
the means by which its members and associates conduct various 
criminal activities. "'109 Evidence that is already probative becomes 
essential, and should not be excluded under the rule. 110 The same is true 
regarding expert testimony. Evidence tending to show the enterprise's 
existence and ongoing organization is highly probative and, thus, rarely 
excluded under Rule 403. 111 
2. Scope of the Conspiracy 
We have seen how RICO's enterprise concept has played out in 
prosecuting substantive offenses. RICO also aimed at inchoate group 
crime through its conspiracy provision. 112 The majority of RICO 
conspiracy cases charge a conspiracy to violate section 1962( c ), 
conducting an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity or collection of unlawful debt. 113 In interpreting the conspiracy 
provision, courts have held that the words "to conspire" in the statute 
invoke the requirements of common law conspiracy.1 14 The basic 
109. Id. at 1013 (citing United States v. Napolitano, 552 F.Supp. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982)). 
110. Id. (citing United States v. DePalma, 461 F.Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). 
111. United States v. Badalamenti, 810 F .2d 17 (2d Cir. 1987); Salerno, 868 F .2d 524 
(2d Cir. 1989). 
112. Ickier, supra note 62, at 588. To violate RICO, "(1) a person [must] engage in (2) 
a pattern of racketeering activity (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct or 
control of an enterprise." St. Paul Mercury Ins. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 439 (5th Cir. 
2000) (citing Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 242 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(emphasis in the original). "Each concept [in this prohibition] is a term of art which carries 
its own inherent requirements .... " Elliot v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1989). 
Restated in plain English, RICO's core provision prohibits a person employed by or 
associated with an enterprise from conducting the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern 
or racketeering activity. Section 1962( d) builds on this core section by prohibiting 
conspiracies to violate the core provision. For the content of subsections (a), (b), and (c), 
see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962. 
113. Ickier, supra note 62, at 588. 
114. The relevant statutory phrase in section 1962(d) is "to conspire." Salinas v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) ("We presume Congress intended to use the term in its 
conventional sense, and certain well-established principles follow."). See generally Aetna 
Casualty & Security Co. v. P. & B. Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546, 1561-63 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(defendants need not know details or roles of others if they know of a larger scheme to be 
guilty of a conspiracy, they need only have "knowingly joined" a conspiracy); United States 
v. Gonzales, 921 F.2d 1530, 1539-40 (11th Cir. 1991) ("That the many defendants and 
predicate crimes were different, or even unrelated, ... [is] irrelevant, so long as it ... [can] 
be reasonably inferred that each crime was intended to further the enterprise."); United 
States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1989) (requiring that a defendant "know the 
general nature of the enterprise and know that the enterprise extends beyond his individual 
role"). United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 562 (2d Cir. 1988) ("A RICO conspiracy 
is ... by definition broader than an ordinary conspiracy to commit a discrete crime .... "); 
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conduct required is agreement. At the English common law, a 
conspiracy was punishable even though no overt act, that is, no act 
beyond the mere making of the agreement, was completed. 115 A mere 
tacit understanding is sufficient to find an agreement was formed. 116 
Thus, it is possible for two or more parties to form a conspiracy even 
though they do not know the others' identity, are not all aware of the 
details of the objective, or are not all original members of the scheme. 117 
The clandestine nature of conspiratorial agreements often makes it 
difficult to present direct evidence that an agreement transpired. Thus, 
juries may properly "rely on inferences drawn from the course of 
conduct of the alleged conspirators" to establish an agreement. 118 
The person's privy to the agreement and the objective of the 
agreement control the scope of the conspiracy. In this regard, RICO 
represents an expansion of traditional conspiracy law. At American 
common law, defendants engaged in diverse criminal activity that was 
superficially unrelated could not be joined in one conspiracy. This was 
because a single agreement or common objective could not be inferred 
from such assorted activity. RICO helps eliminate this problem. "[T]he 
object of a RICO conspiracy is to violate a substantive RICO 
provision . . . and not merely to commit each of the predicate crimes 
United States v. Valera, 845 F.2d 923, 930 (I Ith Cir. 1988) ("Under the RICO Act ... a 
series of agreement, which, pre-RICO, would constitute multiple conspiracies, can form, 
under RICO, a single 'enterprise' conspiracy"); United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 
1233-34 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Congress intended to authorize the single prosecution of a 
multifaceted, diversified conspiracy .... The RICO statutes permit the joinder into a single 
RICO count or counts several diverse predicate acts .... "). 
115. See, e.g., King v. Gill, 106 Eng. Rep. 341 (1818), Poulterers' Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 
813 ( 1611 ). Despite that at common law, no overt act was required, the law of conspiracy 
does not violate the oft quoted precept that "the law does not punish criminal thoughts." 
This is because "the criminal agreement itself is the actus reus." United States v. Shabani, 
513 U.S. 10, 16 (1994). 
116. See e.g., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 778 (1975) ("The agreement need 
not be shown to have been explicit. It can instead be inferred from the facts and 
circumstances of the case"); United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 969 (11th Cir. 1982). 
117. United States v. Burchinal, 657 F.2d 985, 990-93 (8th Cir. 1981). 
118. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221(1939); accord WAYNER. 
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 623 (4th ed. 2003). Allowing the prosecution to rely on inference 
of the agreement via the conduct of the alleged conspirators is by no means a new idea. 
This idea has been traced back to 183 7 in an oft quoted jury instruction that read: 
If you find that these persons pursued by their acts the same object, often by the 
same means, one performing one part of an act and the other performing another 
part of same act, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the object 
which they were pursuing, you will be at liberty to draw the conclusion that they 
have been engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. 
WAYNER. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 623 (4th ed. 2003) (quoting Regina v. Murphy, 172 
Eng. Rep. 502 (1837)). 
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necessary to demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity."119 Thus, 
defendants are properly charged with a conspiracy to violate RICO even 
if they "did not commit or even agree to commit the predicate acts that 
are elements of a substantive count to be found guilty of the 
racketeering conspiracy, for 'it suffices that he adopted the goal of 
furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor. "'120 
This broad definition of conspiracy, which requires neither overt 
acts 121 nor an agreement to commit two predicate crimes, 122 allows the 
statute to reach the higher level participants of organized crime. To 
appreciate this difference consider the scope of conspiracy under 
Salinas v. United States. 123 In that case, a sheriff and his deputy were 
charged with taking bribes in violation of section 666(a)(l)(B), 124 one 
substantive RICO count, and conspiracy tb violate the RICO statute. 
The deputy, Mario Salinas, was convicted of all but the substantive 
RICO count. 125 In appealing his conviction, Salinas challenged that he 
was entitled the jury instruction that, in order to be convicted for a 
RICO conspiracy, he must have committed or agreed to commit two 
predicate offenses. 126 A unanimous Court opined that Salinas was not 
entitled to such an instruction, as it was sufficient that Salinas "accepted 
numerous bribes and . . . knew about and agreed to facilitate the 
scheme."127 The paradigm of an organized crime family is an insulated 
hierarchical system, wherein those in the bottom rungs of the ladder 
often are the ones committing the substantive offences under the 
knowledge and facilitation of the enterprise's leaders. The Court in 
setting aside the two-act rule in Salinas acknowledged that RICO 
enlarged the traditional scope of conspiracy and permits joinder of those 
who facilitate violations, but might otherwise be considered unrelated. 
3. The Scope of the Pattern 
RICO's enterprise concept plays a critical role in joinder of 
offenses and offenders. The concept unites what might otherwise be 
119. United States v. Elliott, 571F.2d880, 902 (5th Cir. 1978). 
120. United States v. Ciccone, 312 F.3d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 2002) (RICO conspiracy 
required no overt act). 
121. Id. 
122. United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.2d 78, 99 (two act rule set aside). 
123. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-4 (1997) 
124. Theft or bribery concerning programs receiving Federal funds, 18 U.S.C. § 666 
(2006); Salinas, 522 U.S. 52 (1997). 
125. Salinas, 522 U.S. 52 (1997). 
126. Id. at 61. 
127. Id. at 66. 
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diverse offenses committed by the same defendant or defendants and 
makes joinder possible. Similarly, RICO's requirement of a "pattern of 
racketeering activity" unites what would otherwise be an assorted set of 
predicate offenses. The concept of a "pattern of racketeering activity" 
thus facilitates joinder beyond the common law conspiracy or the 
"common scheme" joinder of what the Federal Rules would allow in the 
context of individual offenses standing alone. 
A pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of 
which occurred after the effective date of this chapter [October 15, 
1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any 
period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of 
racketeering .... " 128 The two violations may be violations of state or 
federal law, they need not be violations of the same statute, and the acts 
need not be previously charged. 129 Simply proving two acts may not, 
however, be enough to establish a violation. The Supreme Court in 
H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 130 held that the 
prosecution must prove a relationship between the predicate acts (or an 
external organizing principle) and continuity (or its threat) of those acts 
in order to prove a "pattern of racketeering activity." This test, 
commonly referred to as the "continuity plus relationship requirement," 
has read this provision to mean that "there is something to a RI CO 
pattern beyond simply the number of predicate acts involved."131 
In order to establish continuity, the acts must either consist of "a 
series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of 
time" 132 or present "the threat of continuing activity"133 The Court 
suggested that continuity should be examined on a case by case basis, 134 
but that ultimately "development of these concepts must await future 
cases."135 
The relationship requirement is met when a pattern of predicate 
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2005). See generally, G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and 
Civil Remedies, 53 TEMPLE L. Q. 1009, 1029-30 (1980) (describing the element of "pattern" 
in the RICO statute). 
129. Sedima v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 482, 488-92 (1985) (holding that there 
was no requirement of a prior conviction of a racketeering offense in order to succeed on a 
civil RICO charge). 
130. H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). 
131. Id. at 238-39. 
132. Id. at 242. 
133. Id at 239 (citing 116 CONG. REC. 18940 (1970) (Sen. McClellan (quoting S. REP. 
No. 91-617))). 
134. Id. at 243 . 
135. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243. 
26
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2006], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol34/iss1/3
2006] A RICO Legal Structure for the United Kingdom 67 
acts "embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, 
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise 
are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated 
events."136 This interpretation of "pattern" extends the scope beyond 
traditional conspiracy law137 or "multiple scheme" joinder under the 
federal rules. 138 In organized crime prosecutions, the "pattern of 
racketeering activity" brings together an enterprise's illegal activities 
and allows for one trial. 139 The relationship between the "pattern" and 
the "enterprise" is key. Two racketeering acts "that are not directly 
related to each other may nevertheless be related indirectly because each 
is related to the RICO enterprise."14° For example, evidence of a 
murder and an illegal sportbooking operation, are properly joined, 
provided that these "predicate act[ s] [are] sufficiently related to the 
enterprise's activities."141 Further, the predicate acts need only be 
related to the affairs of the enterprise, they need not further the 
enterprise's buisness. 142 Thus, the relationship between "pattern" and 
136. Id. at 240 (quoting Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act, Title X, 18 
U.S.C. § 3575 (repealed 1984)). 
137. In traditional conspiracy law, charging one conspiracy and proving several 
conspiracies may justify a reversal, even if no evidence was improperly admitted against a 
defendant. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). That indictment 
charged one large conspiracy, and the prosecution proved eight smaller conspiracies. The 
Court found, "The dangers of transference of guilt from one to another across the line 
separating conspiracies, subconsciously or otherwise, are so great that no one really can say 
prejudice to substantial right has not taken place." Id. at 774. Further, to be guilty of a 
conspiracy charge, a defendant need not have been personally engaged in a prohibited 
activity. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-4 (1997). Aiders and abettors and co-
conspirators are equally liable for predicate acts committed by co-defendants. Salinas, 522 
U.S. at 63. 
138. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
139. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir. 1978) ("RICO helps to 
eliminate ... [problems common to joint trials] by creating a substantive offense which ties 
together these diverse parties and crimes."); United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 909-10 
(1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) ("This case points up another infirmity in the 
government's interpretation of RICO: it avoids the strictures of Rule 8(b ). By inserting the 
RICO conspiracy charge, the government consolidated in one indictment acts and 
transactions which otherwise could not have been joined."). 
140. United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1383 (2d Cir. 1989) (en bane) (finding 
that three murders committed at the behest of the Bonanno crime family forms a pattern). 
141. United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1108 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[I]nformal 
organization associated for the common purpose of engaging in an ongoing course of 
criminal conduct, including extortion, loansharking, illegal gambling, and trafficking in 
stolen property" can demonstrate a pattern ofracketteering activity). 
142. United States v. Losascio, 6 F.3d 924, 943 (2d Cir. 1993) (deciding that, in the 
trial of John Gotti, the jury was properly instructed that it could find the defendants guilty 
even if it found that the racketeering acts charged in the indictment were committed 
exclusively for the individual's own purpose, not to further the goals of the Gambino 
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"enterprise" encompases more than the acts might otherwise be joined 
absent a RICO charge. 143 
4. Proving the Conspiracy 
The co-conspirator exemption to the hearsay rule helps obviate the 
difficulties in proving large-scale conspiracies and conspiratorial 
agreements. At American common law and under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the statements of a party's co-conspirators can be used 
against a party as a party admission. 144 This hearsay exception is an 
important weapon in combating RICO offenses. The co-conspirator 
exemption to the hearsay rule (defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
as an admission by a party-opponent) states that "a statement is not 
hearsay" and is therefore admissible if made "by a coconspirator of a 
party during the course, and in furtherance of, the conspiracy."145 The 
rationale for this rule is based on a theory of agency. The "unity of 
interests" of the conspirators generally makes it reasonable to treat any 
statement against interest made by a co-conspirator as an adopted 
statement of the defendant. 146 A conspiracy need not be charged for the 
statement to be admissible, but the trial judge must find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the statement was made by a co-
conspirator of the defendant in furtherance of the conspiracy. 147 A 
statement consisting of merely "idle chatter" is thus excluded by the 
rule. 148 
In a RICO trial, the statements of co-conspirators become vitally 
important in proving the scope of the enterprise and each defendant's 
family). 
143. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 274 (6th Cir. 1979) rev'd, 642 F.2d 1001 
(6th Cir. 1980) (en bane). In Sutton, the defendants "were running a virtual department 
store of crime." Id. at 274 (dissent). When the RICO charge failed in Sutton, "joinder of the 
remaining counts could not have been sustained under Rule 8." Id. at 272; see also 
Turkette, 632 F .2d at 909-10. 
144. Federal Rule 80l(d)(2)(E) reads that a statement is not hearsay if it is: 
[A] statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of 
the conspiracy. The contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone 
sufficient to establish the declarant's authority under subdivision (C), the agency or 
employment relationship and scope thereof under subdivision (D), or the existence 
of the conspiracy and the participation therein of the declarant and the party against 
whom the statement is offered under subdivision (E). 
FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(2)(E). 
145. Id. 
146. United State v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1999). 
147. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987); accord United States v. 
Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 958 (2d Cir. 1990). 
148. Salerno, 868 F.2d at 536. 
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role in the organization. 149 Furthermore, much more co-conspirator 
hearsay is available. 150 This is because "the conspiratorial ingenuity of 
La Cosa N ostra expands the normal boundaries of a criminal enterprise, 
and Rule 801 ( d)(2)(E) must expand accordingly to encompass the full 
extent of the conspiracy."151 There are more conspirators and thus more 
available statements in furtherance of the conspiracy, but also much 
more for a presecutor to prove. The co-conspirator exception to the 
hearsay rule is useful in prosecuting organized crime because the 
hierarchical structure involved. This structure, with its various levels of 
participation, often includes oath of silence and threats discouraging 
members from testifying against each other. In the event that the 
government is able to "tum" one of the members, the testimony of the 
member about other conspirators statement is admissible under the co-
conspirator exception; it is often the most probative and important 
evidence in securing the conviction. 152 
When Congress enacted RICO, it did so as part of a comprehensive 
effort to change the means by which the government attacked organized 
crime. 153 When Congress changed the substantive law, it necessarily 
changed the application of procedural and evidentiary rules. Thus, 
RICO's focus on "enterprise" criminality makes a single trial of all 
offenders in a crime family possible and appropriate. The statute's 
success has been in part because it permits a judge and jury to 
149. See, e.g., United States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that 
statements informing other members "as to the progress or status of the conspiracy" are 
admissible under the exception); United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 837 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(finding that statements "which provide[s] reassurance, serve[s] to maintain trust and 
cohesiveness among them, or inform[s] [them] of the current status of the conspiracy 
further[s] the ends of the conspiracy") (internal citations omitted); United States v. Paone, 
782 F.2d 386, 391 (2d Cir. 1986) (admitting a narrative of several murders by apprising a 
coconspirator of the progress of the conspiracy); United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 716 
(2d Cir. 1987) (trial court's ruling on whether a statement was "in furtherance" of the 
conspiracy only overturned if clearly erroneous); U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 24, 
at 139-41. 
150. Gigante, 166 F.3d at 82. 
151. Id. 
152. See e.g., Paone, 782 F.2d at 390. In Paone, one witness testified about a 
conversation regarding a murder in which the defendants participarted. One defendant was 
"reported as commenting on the manner in which [the victim] was killed, stating that it took 
only one bullet." Id. Another defendant "was reported as saying he wished that he had been 
present to watch [him] bleed." Id. The court held that while this testimony was graphic and 
devastating to the defendant's case, it was nevertheless admissible under the exception. Id. 
153. For a discussion of the legislative history surrounding RICO, see G. Robert 
Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 249-80 
(1982); see also, G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy , Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & 
Young, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345, 1666-75 (1995). 
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understand exactly what the defendants did in a way that the American 
common law procedural and evidentiary rules did not. 
III. ENGLISH EXPERIENCE: JOINDER AND SEVERANCE 
The success of RICO makes the statute an appealing model for 
other nation's legislation. In late 2004, when the U.K. considered 
modernizing its organized crime legislation, the Home Office looked to 
RIC0. 154 After a cursory review of the statute, the Home Office in its 
White Paper, "One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat 
Organized Crime," dismissed RICO as "not need[ed] at this stage."155 
Its evaluation of the statute did not, however, consider the procedural 
and evidentiary impact of the statute. This section discusses the current 
landscape of the U.K. legal system with respect to its application of 
procedural and evidentiary rules. Part A briefly discusses organized 
crime in the U.K., as the nation's perception of the problem will 
inevitably effect the legislative relief fashioned. Part B explains the 
existing procedural rules and how they militate against prosecuting 
group crime in the U .K. Part C examines the evidentiary rules and 
corresponding rights of defendants. 
A. Perception of the problem 
In 2004, the Home Office issued a White Paper titled "One Step 
Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime." The 
White Paper was not to first and, arguably, will not be the last, attempt 
to understand organized crime in the U.K. Previous inquires occurred 
in 1989 when the Home Affairs Committee considered the impact of 
organized crime in connection with drug trafficking. 156 The issue was 
revisited again in 1995 by the Home Affairs Committee157 and again 
154. See HOME OFFICE, ONE STEP AHEAD: A 21ST CENTURY STRATEGY TO DEFEAT 
ORGANISED CRIME, 2004, Cm. 6167' at 40, available at 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs3/wp_organised_crime.pdf [hereinafter White Paper]. 
155. Id. 
156. This committee produced both the report DRUG TRAFFICKING AND RELATED 
SERIOUS CRIME, 1988-89, H.C. 370, and PRACTICAL POLICE CO-OPERATION IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1989-90, H.C. 363-I. Neither takes on trial procedure as a means 
of effectively enforcing existing states. Both these committees [sic] were representative of a 
growing European awareness of organized crime, particularly the transboundary issues of 
crime. See, e.g., HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ORGANISED CRIME: REPORT, TOGETHER WITH 
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE, 1994-95, H.C. 18-I, at ix n.1 [hereinafter 1995 
REPORT] (citing Dutch Parliament, Italian Parliament, and EU Parliament reports on 
organized crime). 
157. 1995 REPORT, supra note 156; HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ORGANIZED CRIME: 
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1994-95, H.C. 18-II [hereinafter 1995 EVIDENCE]; HOME AFFAIRS 
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most recently in the White Paper. Nevertheless, these attempts were 
largely innocent of the procedural and evidentiary issues that surface in 
an organized crime trial. While most of these attempts considered and 
dismissed the implementation of a RICO-type statute, the analyses did 
not consider the advantages of modernizing the trial process. 
Specifically, the reports did not consider the benefits of a RICO-type 
trial in which the judge and jury can see exactly what the defendants 
have done, in way that was not exposed in the context of English 
common law offenses and their concomitant procedural and evidentiary 
rules. 
B. Organized Crime in the U.K.? 
The nation's perception of organized crime will inevitably shape 
the form of relief chosen. The clandestine nature of organized crime 
adds complexity to any assessment of the scope of the problem and the 
U.K. is no different. 158 The Committee Reports and White Paper see 
organized crime as primarily an issue of enforcement159 and frontier 
control. 160 This summer, the White Paper proposed the creation of a 
new enforcement branch: The Serious Organized Crime Agency. 161 The 
agency brings together the National Checking Service (NCS), the 
National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), Her Majesty's Customs 
& Excise (HMCE), and the Immigration Service's intelligence efforts 
and eliminates problems of "duplication" and "bureaucracy."162 
The White Paper recognized, more so than any other attempt, that 
COMMITTEE, ORGANIZED CRIME: MEMORANDA, 1994-95, H.C.18-11 [hereinafter 1995 
MEMORANDA]. 
158. Much of the U.S. information on the activities of organized criminals has been 
supplied via wiretaps obtained pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 212-225 (1968) (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521) (1988)); S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 66 (1968). The U.K., in the 
wake of the July 2005 terrorist attacks, proposed changes to its domestic wiretapping law. 
See, e.g., Sarah Lyall, 3 Main British Parties to Back Tougher Antiterrorism Laws, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 27, 2005, at A6 (indicating all three parties willingness to admit wiretap 
evidence in terrorism trials); Noel McAdam, Phone-tap Plea in Terror Battle: Blair to 
Consider Move on Evidence, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, July 22, 2005. 
159. 1995 REPORT, supra note 156 (concluding that "there is a considerable need for 
coordination in intelligence sharing and operational action between agencies" but that better 
enforcement could be obtained through the "development of existing structures rather than 
the creation of a new one."). 
160. Id. at xxxiv ("We conclude that it remains vital for the government to ensure that 
(a) that there is no erosion in the effectiveness of the United Kingdom's frontier controls, 
and (b) that the External Frontiers Convention, when it is eventually concluded, will be 
effective in protecting both Europe's external frontiers and the U .K.' s national borders."). 
161. See White Paper, supra note 154, at 21. 
162. Id. at 22. 
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"most organized criminals in the U.K. are U.K. nationals."163 Until the 
late 1980s, the term "organized crime" was used "almost exclusively to 
describe Sicilian-American crime groups in North America."164 Indeed, 
the 1995 reports on organized crime show almost no awareness of 
homegrown organized crime. The Home Office Report to the 
Committee suggested that "there do not appear to be any domestic 
groups in this country of the level of organization or sophistication that 
would meet the NCIS definition [of organized crime]."165 Furthermore, 
the Committee found no evidence that organized crime was operating 
within the higher echelons of government or unions in the U.K. 166 
Accordingly, since the U.K. found no evidence in 1995 of any problem 
starting at home, the response was largely an appeal for multilateral 
policing so as to prevent the spread of crime from nations in South 
America or Eastern Europe. 167 
1. The White Paper's Response 
The 2004 White Paper takes a different approach. The links 
between the U .K. and other nations are still emphasized, but the need 
for better legislation was acknowledged. The Home Office "found a 
number of areas where the current legal framework appears not to be fit 
for purpose in combating organized crime and has developed a series of 
proposals for enhanced powers to be targeted on those who cause most 
163. Id. at 11. 
164. 1995 MEMORANDA, supra note 157, Memo 15, at 193 (Dr. Barry A. K. Rider, 
Organized Crime in the United Kingdom: A Personal Perspective). 
165. 1995 REPORT, supra note 156, at xv (citing 1995 EVIDENCE, supra note 157, at 
147, Q6). The report goes on to state the opinion of one expert that "there is little evidence 
that in the United Kingdom, there are indigenous groups which have these characteristics 
[ie: of organized crime groups]." Further, the CPS reported that the "gang-land crime in 
East London, such as that encountered in the 1960s ... has not generally been encountered 
in the last few years." Id. at xv. 
166. See 1995 EVIDENCE, supra note 157, at 147, Q361. The U.K. was found to be less 
likely than other countries to be vulnerable to corruption. The Home Office memo stated in 
part this is because the U .K. does not have "a history of corruption which can help 
organized groups get a strong foothold. We benefit from having a well established public 
sector with safe guards ... against partiality and corruption." Id. 
167. See 1995 REPORT, supra note 156, at xv-xviii. The 1995 report evinces a very "its 
an island, so if you didn't bring it, it's not here approach" type approach. As stated above, 
the recommendations are aimed at prevention and policing rather than legislative 
enactments and trial procedures. This is not to say that this approach is right or wrong, only 
that the U.K. perception of organized crime has shaped the Committee's response. To the 
extent the 1995 report addressed the criminal procedure, and it did in paragraphs 148-157, 
the Committee did not address issues of joinder and evidence. The only procedural reform 
raised (and it was rejected) was a proposal to limit disclosure. Id. at liii. 
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harm."168 Thus, the White Paper begins with RICO, the mother of all 
organized crime statutes. 169 
The White Paper begins its analysis by, quite correctly, pointing 
out the advantages of the statute. RICO enables trials to be removed to 
federal courts,1 70 and allows for longer sentences for offenders. 171 
RICO also allows the prosecutors to link together otherwise diverse 
crimes committed in the context of racketeering. The White Paper 
points out, as most important among the statute's salient feature, the use 
of civil RICO as an enforcement measure. 172 The Paper concludes that: 
Against this background, the Government has carefully considered the 
case for RICO style legislation to be introduced here. We are not 
convinced of the need at this stage. To work, RICO still needs 
sufficient evidence to convict on the underlying "predicate" offence 
before these can be set in the wider racketeering context. It does not, 
therefore, help against those targets who have evaded detection 
altogether. RICO appears to be more useful against traditional 
"racketeering" organisations than the sort of large scale trafficking 
groups which are the main threat in the U .K. 173 
Instead of suggesting a RICO-type statute, the Commission opts 
for future legislative enactments that enhance current legislation. 
Specifically, organized criminals are most likely to be charged with a 
specific act to supply commodity, which as the White Paper suggests, 
only counters low-level organizers and couriers.1 74 Additionally, the 
paper suggests other legislative solutions like revamping conspiracy 
provisions or creating a membership crime.1 75 To the degree that these 
168. White Paper, supra note 154, at 39. 
169. Id. at 40. This is not the first time that the RICO has been suggested by U.K. 
crime reform efforts. Dr. Barry Rider of Jesus College in Cambridge submitted a 
memorandum to the Home Affairs Committee in 1995 arguing for the adoption of a RICO-
type statute. The statute was only mentioned once in the Committee's final report, but 
apparently no further consideration was taken at that time. 
170. Because RICO is a federal criminal statute it incorporates a jurisdictional element 
of the offence, namely that the enterprise effect interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-
( c) (2004); RICO Enterprise Concept, supra note 55, at 678. This clearly, is not a selling 
point in the U .K. legal system, which has neither a state nor federal government; they have 
only "government." 
171. Under criminal RICO, the person guilty of acquiring, maintaining, or conducting 
an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity may be heavily fined and imprisoned 
for up to 20 years, or for life, if the maximum penalty for a predicate offense includes life. 
18 U.S.C. §1963 (2004). 
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hypothetical statutes would be effective, they still do not address one of 
the primary problems in that U.K. criminal procedure strongly prefers 
small trials, which almost inevitably fails to join together the offender 
and offense and allow crucial evidence of the involvement of organized 
crime leaders. The White Paper failed to address one important aspect 
of RICO's success: the joinder of offenses and offenders into one trial 
that allows the judge and jury to see exactly what the offenders have 
done. 
2. The Consultation Papers Guidance 
The White Paper's response was informed by the work of Michael 
Levi, a professor of criminology and consultant to the Home Office. 
Professor Levi, in his consultation paper to the British government, 
summarizes some of RICO's procedural advantages illustrated in this 
Article. 176 Levi states that the statute both "enables prosecutors to show 
the nature of an enterprise, putting forward a context within which the 
offences occurred" and eases "issues of joinder and severance ... 
permitting a trial of more co-defendants."177 Nevertheless, Levi 
discourages enacting a RICO-type statute in the U.K. because the 
statute lengthens trials, confuses the jury, and requires more proof than 
traditional conspiracy crimes. 178 Levi concludes that RICO, while 
176. MICHAEL LEVI & ALASTER SMITH, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZED 
CRIME CONSPIRACY LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO ENGLAND AND 
WALES (Home Office Online Report 2002), 
www .homeoffice.gov. uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr 1702.pdf. 
177. Id. at 4. 
178. Id. at 4-5. Levi enumerates seven specific objections to the statute: 
1. It takes a lot of work to build up a case. Investigators need accurate intelligence 
about an organisation before they can start. They need databases and intelligence 
analysts and good computer systems that are capable of dealing with 10 years of 
data including assets, upfront businesses and covert businesses. 
2. There are Performance Indicator implications, as there will be smaller numbers 
of cases (though the number of individual defendants could be used as an 
alternative). 
3. It lengthens trials and the jury sometimes loses track of particular defendants and 
their roles, this in tum sometimes leads to severances of cases. 
4. It may also be hard for jurors to appreciate what constitutes an 'enterprise' under 
the legislation. It is somewhat labyrinthine to show a pattern of crimes and the 
existence of an organisation to carry them out, and then that the organisation is 
operating through a pattern of criminal activity. 
5. There are regional variations. Judges in Manhattan get many cases, whereas 
regional ones are rarer. The level of judicial experience, as well as regional court 
cultures, sometimes produces what is regarded as "bad law." 
6. There is a risk of abuse which, both as an issue of principle and to preserve 
existing powers from judicial and political attack, has to be monitored. 
7. There are human rights concerns over the potential for the legislation to be used 
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successful against organized crime on the U.S. Continent, could not be 
successfully transplanted because the cultural difference between the 
U.S. and U.K. He states: 
One can think of no 20th century U.K. parallels to the levels of corrupt 
control over city life and aspects of commercial services that have 
been witnessed in the U.S. Although there have been instances of 
entrenched local cultures of corruption in England and Wales, there 
have been none yet revealed that include large trenches of police as 
well as elected officials, and no systematically corrupt union 
domination or pension fund abuses or toxic waste dumping has 
surfaced in England or Wales. 179 
For all of these reasons, he concludes, the cost of implementing a 
RICO type statute outweighs the "numerically small but perhaps 
over-zealously. 
Id. 
Levi's first point is fair enough. In a RICO case, the prosecutor must prove additional 
elements not present in traditional common law offenses, namely the "enterprise" and 
"pattern" of predicate activity. As illustrated in Part 1 of this Article, more evidence is 
available to the prosecutor by the operation of the "enterprise" and "pattern" concepts. So 
while an element may require proof, much more is admissible to prove that element. In the 
U.S., wiretapping is instrumental in proving the "enterprise" and "pattern" elements. In the 
U.K., wiretap evidence is inadmissible. To the extent Professor Levi's concern is that RICO 
would be useless without wiretap evidence, an amendment to the U.K.'s law of evidence is 
in order. Id. at 17. This Article argues for such a change. If, instead, this point is arguing 
that a RICO statute would require expenditures for wiretapping evidence, such equipment is 
already in use. According to the Home Office's own website, wiretapping is successfully 
used by the Home Office. In 2003 alone, wiretapping lead to over 1,680 arrests. Frequently 
Asked Questions, http://www.homeoffice.gov. uk/terrorism/faq/atcsa_faq.html# 1 (last 
visited July 17, 2005) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions]. Yet, in each of these cases 
the wiretap evidence was inadmissible in at trial. 
Levi's second point, that implementing a RICO statute would require a change in internal 
procedures for counting cases, seems to have answered itself. Joint trials would 
presumptively yield fewer cases, but the total number of defendants could increase. Indeed, 
the joint trial seems to be at the core of Levis objections. This Article specifically addresses 
point 3 and 4. See infra Part IV(B)(2). 
Levi's last two objections are not unique to RICO. Like most federal statutes, RICO has 
developed regional nuances that vary within the circuits. Nevertheless, when considering 
whether to adopt a RICO-type statute, the U.K. is not married to any particular 
interpretation. The drafters of such a hypothetical RICO statute could easily insert language 
favoring one interpretation over another. Similarly, the overzealous use of a criminal statute 
is not unique to RICO. Any criminal statute can be misused or overused, that choice is left 
to the prosecutor. If the concern is that a RICO-type statute would be too powerful, the 
drafters could require prior authorization to use the statute. Such is the case in the U.S .. See 
Department of Justice, supra note 24. 
179. LEVI & SMITH, supra note 176, at 16. 
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strategically important cases in which RICO legislation might lead to 
convictions."180 
The Consultation Paper misunderstands two important features of 
RICO. First, RICO has proven to be a powerful tool against legitimate 
business and government offices infiltrated by organized crime, yet its 
scope is not limited to such instances. As the Supreme Court held in 
Turkette, "neither the language nor structure of RICO limits its 
application to legitimate 'enterprises. "'181 
Second, the White Paper and the Consultation paper informing its 
decision are premised on the notion that the U.K. does not experience 
true "organized crime" crime in the same way the US does or did prior 
to the passage of RICO. They state that "RICO appears to be more 
useful against traditional 'racketeering' organizations than the sort of 
large-scale trafficking groups which are the main threat to the U.K."182 
The visible manifestations of organized crime in the U.K. are manifold. 
The U.K. experiences drug crimes, 183 human trafficking, 184 international 
car theft rings, and counterfeit goods smuggling. 185 While a full-scale 
investigation of organized crime is far beyond the scope of this Article, 
a preliminary look at the crimes reported in London's newspapers 
reveal the presence of precisely the kind of groups RICO's enterprise 
concept has been so effective against. For example, large groups of 
Eastern European women are routinely trafficked, against their will, into 
Britain for prostitution. These kinds of operations require a host of 
"suppliers" in Eastern Europe, "importers" to physically move these 
180. Id. at 17. 
181. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981). 
182. White Paper, supra note 154, at 40. 
183. Stewart Tendler, Suspected Drugs Baron Arrested, TIMES (London), Mar. 18, 
2005, at 35 (leader of a 15 member gang arrested for smuggling three tons of cocaine into 
Britain from 1996 to 1998); Daniel McGrory, "Drugs Boss" Is Silent As Investigators Seize 
£ 5m, TIMES (London), Mar. 25, 2005, at 16; Stewart Tendler, Family of Drug Barons Kept 
Their Stash in Crooked Bank, TIMES (London), May 11, 2005, at 9. 
184. Rosemary Bennet, Men Who Pay for Sex with Trafficked Girls to Face Rape 
Charge, TIMES (London), Mar. 2, 2005, at 24 ("[I]n 2002, 1,400 women are trafficked into 
Britain for sex and [there is reason to believe] that figure has doubled"); Andrew Norfolk, 
Millionaire Gangmaster Faces Jail Over His Scots Factory Slave Army, TIMES (London), 
Feb. 4, 2005, at 11 (man arrested for transporting Eastern Europeans to U.K. to work for 
"slave wages"). 
185. Illegal importation of other illegal products is also sophisticated in the U.K.. See 
e.g., Jon Ungoed-Thomas, Designer Fakes "Are Funding Al-Qaeda," TIMES (London), Mar. 
20, 2005, at 14 (cheap counterfeits of designer goods funding terrorist organizations); 
Anthony Browne, Customs Not Able to Keep Up With Rise of Fake Goods, TIMES (London), 
Feb. 9, 2005, at 29 ("Britain is losing the battle with organized criminals smuggling 
counterfeit goods in the country."). 
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women, and coordination of over 730 flats in London to house and 
control women upon their arrival, not to mention associates to launder 
the profits. 186 These groups have the coordination to engage in large-
scale international criminal enterprises, yet they are not considered 
"organized crime" in the U .K. These few examples, pulled from the 
front pages, indicate the tip of the iceberg of U.K. crime. The 
possibilities of criminal enterprises operating just under the surface of 
detection are endless. Still, neither the 1995 reports nor the White 
Paper recognizes this phenomena. 
3. U.K. Criminal Procedure 
Before examining the law relating to group trials in the U.K., a 
brief introduction to the nation's criminal procedure and defendants' 
rights are in order. The U .K. is one of very few traditional common law 
countries without a written constitution. 187 As a result, there was a 
limited public understanding of the form and substance of a U.K. 
citizen's rights. 188 Until the European Convention on Human Rights of 
1998 came into force in October 2, 2000, few rights were codified.189 
Indeed, even after the adoption of the Convention, some rights that 
British citizens enjoy, like the law of double jeopardy, cannot be found 
in statute form. 190 Whenever convention rights are at issue, the courts 
are not bound by pre-convention precedent191 and they "must take into 
account" judgments, decisions, or declarations of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR). 192 Most of the ECHR interactions with the 
criminal law involve the concept of a fair trial193 (Art. 6) and the 
186. Bennett, supra note 184. 
187. See generally Penny Darbyshire, EDDEY & DARBYSHIRE ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL 
SYSTEM § 1-021. 
188. Id. ("There is no talk of fundamental constitutional rights, as is common in 
Germany or France and is drummed into each child's memory in the United States, because 
we don't think we have any."). 
189. Id. 
190. J.R. Spencer, The Case for a Code of Criminal Procedure, 2000 CRIM. L. REv. 
519,522. 
191. Darbyshire, supra note 187, § 4-006 (citing 1997 White Paper, Rights Brought 
Home). 
192. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR], 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 
2006). Taking these decisions "into account" is not necessarily the same as a binding 
precedent. Darbyshire, supra note 187, § 1-022. 
193. ECHR Article 6 provides in full that: 
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
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procedures surrounding unlawful deprivation of liberty194 (Art. 5). The 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be 
pronounced publicly by the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the 
trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the 
parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in 
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law. 
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
(b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if 
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the 
interests of justice so require; 
( d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him; 
( e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court. 
ECHR, supra note 192, art. 6. 
194. ECHR Article 5 provides in full that: 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. 
2. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful 
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed 
by law; 
( c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing 
him before the competent legal authority of reasonable suspicion of having 
committed and offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent 
his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; 
( d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational 
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority; 
( e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of 
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts, or 
vagrants; 
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorized entry into the country or· of a person against whom action is being 
taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 
3. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he 
understands, of the reasons for his arrest and the charge against him. 
4. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
1 ( c) of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a 
reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by 
guarantees to appear for trial. 
5. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily 
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technical due process embodied in Article 6 is by far the most common 
application of these rights. 195 
While a U .K. citizen's rights seem straightforward under the 
Convention, the actual procedure afforded is not always as clear. U.K. 
criminal procedure is dispersed throughout 150 different statutes 
spanning the better portion of two centuries.196 Additionally, a large 
portion of the law of evidence has no statutory basis at all. 197 This has 
made the law of criminal procedure in the U.K. largely inaccessible to 
the public198 and a "nightmare to apply for judges, magistrates' clerks 
and practicing lawyers."199 Multiple campaigns for reform have been 
brought about and there exists a push for the drafting of a 
comprehensive code of criminal procedure.200 These changes did not 
by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
6. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation. 
ECHR, supra note 192, art. 5. 
195. ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM IN ACTION: ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE § 4-005 (2000) (citing G. Chambers, Practicing Human Rights: U.K. lawyers and 
the European Convention on Human Rights, the Law Society Research and Policy Planning 
Unit Research Study No. 28 (London: the Law Society) (explaining that over half the 
applications against the U.K. were made under this article)). 
196. J.R. Spencer, The Case for a Code of Criminal Procedure, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 
519, 520. This is, of course, with the notable exception of the Justices of the Peace Act of 
1361, which is still in force. Id.; WHITE, supra note 195, § 4-002. The Law Commission, in 
its 2000 survey, found: "207 Acts of Parliament devoted to criminal procedure and/or 
evidence, the earliest enacted in 1795; 64 pieces of secondary legislation containing rules 
that differed according to whether they governed summary proceedings or those on 
indictment - 271 different sources of law, procedure and evidence, not including case law or 
guidance from the Lord Chief Justice or the Attorney General." LORD JUSTICE AULD, A 
REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS OF ENGLAND AND w ALES § 272 (2001) [hereinafter 
AULD REPORT], available at http://www.criminal-courts-review.org. uk/ccr-1 O.htm. 
197. Spencer, supra note 196, at 520. 
198. See AULD REPORT, supra note 196. 
199. Darbyshire, supra note 187, § 10-001. 
200. AULD REPORT, supra note 196. Several commissions have evaluated the need for 
a criminal procedure code. Id. For example, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 
of 1981 took note of the problem and produced the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Id. 
Again, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice of 1993, produced the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994, the Criminal Appeal Act of 1995, and the Criminal Procedure 
and Investigations Act of 1996. Id. In 1997 the Narey Report reviewed the system and 
came up with the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998. Id. 
Finally, after the success of the Woolf reforms on the civil justice system, Justice Auld 
conducted a similar comprehensive review of the criminal system and concluded that a 
single, comprehensive code of Criminal Procedure was sorely needed. AULD REPORT, supra 
note 196. In his report the Lord Justice characterizes the current law as problematic because 
"[f]inding the right source or sources can be a time-taking and confusing task for judges and 
experienced criminal law practitioners. And, having found them, the content is often 
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occur as part of the government's organized crime agenda. Yet, in order 
to truly have a "21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organized Crime," 
perhaps the first step to reform is procedure and evidence. 
The current U .K. laws recognize limited instances where offenses 
and defendants can be joined into a single trial. In general, current U.K. 
procedure follows the restrictive English common law view that a trial 
should consist of one defendant answering for a single offense. 
4. Joinder of Offenses Under Current U.K. Law 
The joinder and severance of offenses is controlled by Rule 9 of 
the Indictment Rules of 1971, which provides that joinder is proper if 
the counts are "founded on the same facts, or form or are part of a series 
of offenses that are of the same or similar character. "201 The 
formulation of the rule is similar to the Federal Rules formulation, with 
the notable exception that Federal Rule 8(a) allows joinder of offenses 
that are part of a "common scheme or plan."202 Thus, the joinder of 
offenses in the U.K. should represent a more restrictive system than 
under the Federal Rules. Yet, courts have stretched the language of the 
rule, particularly the "same or similar character" requirement, to 
effectuate j oinder akin to what one would expect under the Federal 
Rules. For example, in Ludlow v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, a 
defendant was charged with one count of attempted theft and one count 
of robbery that allegedly took place sixteen days later.203 While the 
crimes charged were similar in law, the only factual similarity was that 
both offenses were committed in public houses (read: pubs). One 
offense was an attempt to rob a public house, and another was 
seemingly a dispute over a bar tab. The court held that in order to be 
properly joined under the rule, there must be a nexus between the 
offenses. The offenses must be similar in fact and law. Surprisingly, 
the court went on to hold that joinder was proper in Ludlow and that the 
similar location would suffice as a nexus, however slight, between the 
impenetrable and sometimes leads to conflicting decisions." Id. ~ 273. Furthermore, "[flew 
of these sources, standing on their own, represent the whole law or the current law on any 
particular aspect, many of them being subject to piecemeal amendment, often by several 
more recent instruments." Id. ~ 272. The ultimate cost of this disorder is borne by the tax 
payers who pay for the cost of the additional research, injustice, and loss of public 
confidence. Id. ~ 273. 
201. Rule 9 reads in full: "Charges for any offenses may be joined in the same 
indictment if those charges are founded on the same facts, or form or are a part of a series of 
offenses of the same or a similar character." Indictment Rules, 1971, r. 9 (U.K.). 
202. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a); see supra note 20 (quoting the rule in full). 
203. Ludlow v. Metro. Police Comm'r, [1971] A.C. 29 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
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facts. 204 
Even when the offenses have been properly joined under this rule, 
the judge has discretion to order a separate trial where he is "of the 
opinion that a person accused may be prejudiced or embarrassed in his 
defense by reason of being charged with more than one offence in the 
same indictment. "205 The courts have added to this requirement, tacking 
on the additional requisites that the severance must be in the "interests 
of justice" and premised upon some "special feature" that makes the 
joinder of the offenses prejudicial.206 
The rules of joinder and severance are often read in tandem with 
the rules of evidence in order to determine whether a joint trial is 
proper.207 In particular, the English common law upholds a general 
prohibition of "similar fact" evidence, that is, the prosecution may not 
204. Id. 
205. Indictments Act, 1915, § 5(3) (U.K.). The section reads in full: 
( 4) Where, before trial, or at any stage of a trial, the court is of the opinion that the 
postponement of the trial of a person accused is expedient as a consequence of the 
exercise of any powers of the court under this Act to amend an indictment or to 
order a separate trial as appears necessary. 
( 5) Where an order of the court is made under this section for the postponement of a 
trial-
( a) if such order is made during a trial the court may order that the jury are to be 
discharged from giving a verdict on the count or counts the trial of which is 
postponed or on the indictment, as the case may be; and 
(b) the procedure on the separate trial of a count shall be the same in all respects 
as if the count had been found in a separate indictment, and the procedure on the 
postponed trial shall be the same in all respects (if the jury has been discharged) 
as if the trial had not commenced; and 
( c) the court may make such order as to granting the accused person bail and as 
to the enlargement of recongisances and otherwise as the court thinks fit. 
Indictments Act§ 5(3). 
206. Ludlow v. Metro. Police Comm'r, [1971] A.C. 29, 41 (H.L.) (U.K.). Ludlow 
represents the leading case regarding joinder of offenses. There the House of Lords held 
that one count of attempted larceny and one count of robbery were properly joined, despite 
that the only factual similarity was that both offenses were committed in public houses in 
west London. Id. at 30, 41. 
207. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Boardman, [1975] A.C. 421, 449 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
There, Lord Cross stated that: 
If the charges are tried together it is inevitable that the jurors will be influenced, 
consciously or unconsciously, by the fact that the accused being charged not with a 
single offence against one person but with three separate offences against three 
persons. It is said, I know, that to order separate trials in all these cases would be 
highly inconvenient. If and so far as this is true it is reason for doubting the wisdom 
of the general rules excluding similar fact evidence. But so long as there is that 
general rule the court ought to strive to give effect to it loyally and not, while paying 
lip service to it, in effect let in the inadmissible evidence by trying all of the charges 
together. 
Id. at 459. 
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adduce evidence of previous or subsequent bad conduct of the accused 
other than those relating to the offence charged.208 The rationale for this 
rule is that "similar fact" evidence is both irrelevant for showing guilt 
and, insofar as the evidence is relevant, its highly inflammatory nature 
outweighs its relevancy.209 Joinder of offenses has the effect of 
allowing evidence to be put to the jury that would not have been 
admissible if the offenses had been tried alone. In certain 
circumstances, this consideration alone is enough to prove that 
severance should be granted. 210 
Still, severance is a sparingly granted relief.211 Because the 
Indictment Rules grant broad discretion to the trial judge, a ruling on 
severance is difficult, if not impossible to overtum.212 The more 
common relief granted is a jury instruction directing the jurors that they 
may not use the evidence on one count to support that on another.213 
208. See, e.g., R v. Brown, (1963) 47 Crim. App. 204 (holding that evidence of one 
participant pleading guilty to one count of ship-breaking was not admissible in a trial for a 
break-in that occurred five days later since there was no idiosyncratic features to link the 
two offenses); R v. Taylor, (1923) 17 Crim. App. 109 (holding that the accused possession 
of a burglary device found several days after the charged offense was committed was 
inadmissible because it tended to prove disposition and not culpability). 
209. The prohibition of "similar fact" evidence is the British analogue to Rule 404(b) 
which provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of 
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided 
that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide 
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial 
notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
FED. R. Evm. 404(b). Compare with Boardman, [1975] A.C. at 462 (stating what has 
become the classical common law test that "if the crime charged is committed in a uniquely 
or strikingly similar manner to other crimes committed by the accused the manner in which 
the other crimes were committed may be evidence upon which a jury could reasonably 
conclude that the accused was guilty."). 
210. See, e.g., R v. Brooks, (1991) 92 Crim. App. 36 (ruling that after the trial courts 
decision that evidence on three counts of incest was not admissible, the trial court should 
have granted a severance); R v. Sims, [1946] K.B. 531. Normally these certain 
circumstances include counts of sexual offences, which are often considered to be so 
scandalous and prejudicial that they cannot be tried with other charges. Brooks, 92 Crim. 
App. at 42. 
211. LAW CoMM'N, LAW COM No. 273, EVIDENCE OF BAD CHARACTER AT CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 2.91 (2001), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/lc_reports.htm. 
212. Ludlow v. Metro. Police Comm'r, [1971] 1 A.C. 29, 41 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
213. Auld Report, supra note 196, ~ 2.95. 
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5. Joinder of Offenders Under Current U.K. Law 
The indictment may include separate counts and name different 
defendants in each count.214 The joint trial of these counts and 
defendants is not subject to any specific statutory rule: joinder of 
offenders is defined solely by practice. The seminal case controlling 
joint trials is R v. Assim.215 There two defendants, both employees of 
the same night club, were involved in an altercation when a customer 
attempted to leave the club without paying.216 One defendant was 
charged with unlawfully wounding one customer, and his co-defendant 
was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm.217 Since the 
charges were committed against two separate defendants, they were, 
necessarily, charged in two separate counts.218 The court in Assim 
assumed without deciding that the Indictment Rules of 1915, by its 
plain language, only applied to joinder of offenses.219 In the absence of 
a statute, the court can use its "inherent power both to formulate its own 
rules and to vary them in the light of current experience and the needs 
of justice." According to the court, the history of the joint trials did not 
provide guidance, as the prominent publicists of the time and previous 
decisions did not provide a clear benchmark by which to measure the 
appropriateness of a joint trial.220 Thus, the court enunciated that 
214. See, e.g., R v. Assim, (1966) 50 Crim. App. 224. 
215. Practice Direction [ 1971]. 
216. Assim, 50 Crim. App. at 225-26. 
217. Id. at 225. 
218. Id. at233. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 234. The court went on to say that: 
[O]n an examination of the authorities, this court considers that there never has been 
a clear, settled and general practice based on principle as to the occasions when 
joinder of offenders is in the practice correct: moreover, there may well have been 
wide fluctuations as to what might be called the terminal limits at any one time of 
the application of the practice then in force. Indeed, as regards past centuries this 
absence of settled practice is reflected in the variations of views between eminent 
writers, as for instance those expressed in the 1778 and 1800 editions of Hale's 
Pleas of the Crown, pp. 174 and 175 and the 1824 edition of Hawkins ' Pleas of the 
Crown, pp. 331 and 332. 
Id. In light of the finding that no rule of joinder existed, the court, quite generously, took 
upon themselves the burden of making one up. The courts reference to Hale and Hawkins 
here is perhaps disingenuous. Hale's pleas of the crown does not represent an aberration 
from the ordinary rule of joinder of principles and accessories in the same indictment, for 
the same crime. His seminal treatise says: 
But yet the principle and accessory being indicted by one or several indictments, and 
both appearing they may be arraigned at the same time and both pleading not guilty, 
the same jury shall charged with both and directed to inquire of both, viz. first of the 
principle. 
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whether "the matters which constitute the individual offences of the 
several offenders are upon the available evidence so related, whether in 
time or by other factors, that the interests of justice are best served by 
their being tried together," then the defendants can be properly tried 
together, subject always to the ever-present discretion of the court.221 
The Assim court thus opted for an extremely flexible standard 
("interests of justice") rather than a rigid rule. 
The problems with an "interests of justice" test are patent. First, it 
provides little guidance on what "justice" entails and whose "justice" 
should be served. In determining "justice," courts seem to look to a 
myriad of factors: whether separate trials could lead to inconsistent 
verdicts, 222 whether a separate trial would prejudice either the 
prosecution or the defense, convenience to the witnesses,223 potential for 
prejudice in a joint trial, overlapping evidence, and the wishes of the 
defendants. Secondly, the "interests of justice" test, while paying lip 
service to the value of consistency of verdicts, does not itself produce 
consistent results.224 The rule in Assim is read to tolerate some 
prejudice in application, allowing evidence into a joint trial that would 
not have been admissible against one or more defendants tried alone. 
The quantum of prejudice required to overturn a denial of severance is 
variable. Thirdly, inconsistent results are rarely overturned. The Court 
of Appeals interferes only if it can be shown that the trial judge ignored 
relevant decisions, took account of irrelevant decisions, or arrived at a 
MATHEW HALE, 2 HISTORIA PIACITORUM CORONAE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN 222 (1847). 
The later references to Hawkin's dissenting view of joinder is also flawed, primarily in that 
later editions do not include this quote. Thus, sometime between 1824 and May 8, 1966, 
when Assim was decided, Hawkin's (or his editor) changed his mind. Further, a reading of 
Archibald indicates that a rule of joinder existed as far back as 1867. The rule is that 
individuals who jointly commit a criminal act whether "robbery, burglary, or murder, they 
may be indicted for is jointly." Participation in the act is what is essential under this 
reading, andjoinder is not exclusively to acts of robbery, burglary and murder. JON JERVIS, 
ET AL., ARCHBOLD's PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 62-64 (16th ed. 1867). 
Again, "[ w ]here several persons join in the commission of an offence they may be jointly or 
separately indicted for it." HENRY w. DISNEY & HAROLD GUNDRY, THE CRIMINAL LAW: A 
SKETCH OF ITS PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 51 (1895). Thus a rule did exist, however rigid it 
may appear to be, and the rule clearly said what we would think of in modern terms as an 
"act or transaction" test. 
221. Id. 
222. ARCHIBOLD'S PLEADING AND EVIDENCE 155-157 (22nd Ed. 2004). 
223. R v. Crawford, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1329; R v. Edwards, [ 1998] Crim. L.R. 756; R v. 
Grondkowski, [1946] K.B. 369; R. v. Moghal, (1977) 65 Cr.App. 56. 
224. R v. O'Boyle, (1990) 92 Cr.App. 202; R v. Randle [1995] Crim. L.R. 331. 
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manifestly unreasonable decision. 225 
6. Overloading the Indictment 
A fair reading of Assim could imply that perhaps joinder is more 
liberally applied in the U.K. than the U.S. In fact, the Assim opinion 
(and corresponding practice direction) are subject to an additional 
caveat. A trial judge must also consider whether trying a single 
indictment would result in an unduly complicated trial and would place 
undue burden on the jury. The generally followed rule is derived from 
dicta in the case of R v. Novae and its resulting practice direction.226 In 
Novae, four defendants were tried on nineteen counts, each pleading not 
guilty. 227 Three of the defendants were linked via an overarching 
conspiracy count, specifically the conspiracy to procure males under 21 
to commit acts of indecency, and various substantive offences relating 
to the conspiracy. 228 A fourth defendant was tried on roughly similar 
charges related to the conspiracy, but not membership in the 
conspiracy.229 The trial lasted forty-seven working days and required a 
four to five day summing up.230 Ultimately, many of the convictions 
were quashed because of errors in similar-fact evidence and 
corroboration. 231 Lord Justice Bridge concluded that "the indictment of 
19 counts against four defendants resulting in unnecessary length and 
complexity. "232 He went on to find that: 
Quite apart from the question whether the prosecution could find legal 
justification for joining all these counts in one indictment and resisting 
severance, the wider and more important question is whether in such a 
case the interests of justice were likely to be better served by one very 
long trial, or by one moderately long and four very short separate 
trials ... 
Some criminal prosecutions involve consideration of matters so 
plainly inextricable and indivisible that a long and complex trial is an 
ineluctable necessity. But we are convinced that nothing short of the 
criterion of absolute necessity can justify the imposition of the 
225. R v. Grondkowski, [1946] K.B. 369 (affirming joinder even though all members 
of the court strongly indicated that they would not have joined the defendants). 
226. Practice Direction (Crime: Conspiracy) [1977] 1 W.L.R. 537. 





232. ARCHIBOLD'S PLEADING AND EVIDENCE 167 (22nd ed. 2000). 
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burdens of a very long trial on the court. 233 
As a result of the court's clear statement of preference for shorter, more 
straightforward trials, a practice direction was issued. 
The practice direction provides that in an indictment containing 
both substantive and conspiracy counts, "the judge should require the 
prosecution to justify joinder, or, failing justification, to elect whether to 
proceed on the substantive or on conspiracy counts."234 The practice 
direction has worked to create simple trials, where one offender 
answering for a single offense is the rule, and joinder is the exception.235 
That this rule is alive and well in English law is evidenced by the 
courts tersely worded opinion in Ke/lard, the case that has the "ignoble 
distinction" of being England's longest jury trial.236 The trial lasted 252 
working days and involved four defendants charged with twenty-nine 
counts relating to fraudulent trading and conspiracy to defraud. While 
the length and complexity of trial alone was not dispositive of a 
miscarriage of justice, the court went on to rebuke the prosecutor 
because it was his "duty ... to review the evidence in a long case and 
233. Id. 
234. Practice direction (Crime: Conspiracy) [1971] 64 Cr. App. R. 258. In any case 
where an indictment contains substantive counts and a relating conspiracy count, the judge 
should require the prosecution to justify joinder, or, failing justification, to elect whether to 
proceed on the substantive or on the conspiracy counts. "A joinder is justified for this 
purpose if the judge considers that the interests of justice demand it." [1997] 1 W.L.R. at 
537. 
The need for simplicity in the presentation of the case was echoed by Lawton L.J. in the 
context of the length of the indictment in Thome when he said: 
This Court has noticed a tendency recently for prosecuting counsel to overload 
indictments. There must be an end to this. Indictments must be kept short. No more 
accused should be indicted together than is necessary for the proper presentation of 
the ... case . . . . Necessity, not convenience, should be the guiding factor. 
R v. Thome, (1978) 66 Cr.App. 6, 12. Later, "[a]ll that can be said with confidence is that 
the indictment was overloaded, far too many lengthy submissions were made and too much 
time was spent by counsel in addressing the jury. Counsel must curb their verbosity." Id. at 
14. Similar observations by the same leamedjudge were made in the case of Landy, White 
and Kay (1981) 72 Cr.App.R. 237. The most recent authority, and in some respects the 
most relevant to the present appeal, is the case of Cohen. This decision is not fully reported 
and we proceed by reference to the transcript. The length of the trial was described as 
"awesome" as it covered 184 days, a shorter period than that taken by the trial in the present 
case. Peter Hutchesson, R v. Cohen and Others, 142 N.L.J. 1267 (1992). 
235. For example, consider the thirty longest cases heard between 2003 and 2004. The 
average length of these "very long" trials was 67 days (still relatively short by U.S. 
comparison). An average of six defendants was tried in these cases. The jury heard 
testimony from an average of 114 witnesses. DEPARTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A 
FAIRER DEAL FOR LEGAL Am, 2005, 5.5, available at 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/laid/laidfullpaper.pdf [hereinafter A FAIRER DEAL FOR LEGAL Am]. 
236. R v. Kellard, (1995) 2 Crim.App. 134, 140. 
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decide how much of it, even though relevant, [could] be withheld in the 
interests of time and clarity." 237 The preference of the common law of 
joinder, even today, is to preserve the trial unit as one defendant 
answering for a single offence. The practice direction, which requires 
severance of conspiracy and substantive counts, actively works against 
one trial of all of the participants of large scale criminal venture, in 
short, organized crime, or for that matter, terrorism. 
C. Evidence and Human Rights Implications of Joinder 
As stated in Part I, there are special evidence issues that arise in 
joint trials than would otherwise arise in the context of separate 
defendants tried for a single offense. In the United States, admission of 
evidence in a joint trial can have constitutional implications. Admission 
of one defendant's confession in a joint trial against the defendant and 
his co-conspirators can give rise to Confrontation Clause issues, more 
specifically termed a Bruton problem. 238 Additionally, when counts and 
237. Id. at 146. 
238. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Nevertheless, confessions are 
typically not an issue in sophisticated enterprise trials. The more common result is that a 
potential co-defendant will "turn" and testify against his former compatriots at trial, 
eliminating the Bruton problem. Even in the event that a defendant confesses and then 
decided not to testify at trial, neither the English common law nor the European Court of 
Human Rights would cry foul on behalf of the potentially prejudiced co-defendant. The 
common law rule is that admissions and confessions are evidence only against their maker, 
and not against co-defendants whom they might implicate. PETER MURPHY, MURPHY ON 
EVIDENCE 298 (8th ed. 2003). On the other hand, this does not mean that confessions 
implicating a co-defendants are excluded. Instead, the co-accused is entitled only to a 
limiting instruction that the confession can only be used as evidence against the confessor. 
Simply put: there is no Bruton rule in the U.K.. Even the editing of confessions, which is 
key in the United States when the prosecution adduces a confession, is often not permitted. 
The court does not have the power the edit out otherwise admissible evidence in the 
accused's statement unless the prosecution and the accused consent, which is rare. Lobban 
v. R, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 877, 879 (P.C. 1995) (holding that the co-accused was not entitled to 
edit himself out of a co-defendants confession where the material in the confession would 
have been admissible against the confessor); R v. Jefferson, (1994) 99 Crim. App. 13, 24 
(holding the a co-accused could not edit incriminating statements against him, made by his 
co-defendant, out of his co-defendant's information). 
Furthermore, a co-defendant who might be implicated in a confession probably will not find 
relief in the European Convention on Human Rights. Kostovki v. Netherlands, App. No. 
11454/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 434, ~39 (1989) (holding, in part, that is the job of national 
law, not the convention, to regulate domestic evidences laws). 
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights does not 
have the power "to regulate the operation of criminal procedure, including the rules of 
evidence, in a State which is bound by [the Convention]." Kostovski, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 434, 
~39. Thus, unlike the U.S. Constitution that transcends all laws (including those of 
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offenders are joined, it may have the effect of silencing otherwise 
exculpatory witnesses/co-defendants by virtue of the Fifth 
Amendment.239 Finally, counts that should have been joined, but were 
not, can be barred from being brought again under Blockburger and the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.240 
The law of joinder itself militates against prosecuting group crime 
in the U.K. In the rare case that counts are joined, however, it remains 
to be seen to what extent the law of evidence, England's unwritten 
constitution, and the newly applicable European Convention on Human 
Rights protect defendants' rights at trial, while still providing efficient 
and accurate judgments. 
1. Co-conspirator Exception to the Hearsay Rule 
A joint trial, however rare, does confer some advantages on the 
prosecution in U.K. trials. However objectionable a U.S. audience may 
find the treatment of confessions, it is only part of the advantages 
allowed to the prosecutor. Like the U.S., the U.K. also recognizes a co-
conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, albeit the rule is less 
procedure and evidence), these rights do not directly effect domestic law, and U.K. law has 
changed little since their adoption. The Convention does provide, however, that persons 
have a right to a fair trial, including the "right to examine or have examined witnesses 
against him."ECHR, supra note 192, art. 6.3(d). 
When a defendant confesses, implicating other properly joined parties, and then declines to 
take the stand, a co-defendant is left without recourse. Since the evidence is not 
"admissible" against him, he cannot make a confrontation clause challenge. Yet, since 
relatively little is known about the workings of the jury, he cannot be sure that the evidence, 
which is also hearsay, is not being used against him in deliberations. While the Court has 
not had the occasion to consider whether a confession adduced in a joint trial violates this 
right, the Court has considered the admission of hearsay testimony. In Blast/and v. United 
Kingdom, the Court of Human Rights considered the correctness of the hearsay rule on its 
face, and concluded that rule served a relatively benign purpose and was acceptable under 
the Convention. (1987) 10 EHRR 528, 531. Similarly, the U.K. Court of Appeal has 
addressed this issue, holding that the accused rights to a fair trial were not violated when 
hearsay statements of a person who was not called as a witness were admitted against him. 
R v. Gokal, (1997) 2 Crim. App. 266. While the defendant did not have the opportunity to 
confront the witnesses against him, the grant of judicial discretion and the provisions of the 
hearsay rule properly protect the rights of the accused. Thus, a defendant in a joint trial will 
probably face the same fate of having no recourse in a Human Rights appeal. 
239. Alternatively, a co-defendant's testimony may exculpate a defendant. Because the 
co-defendant may not wish to waive his 5th Amendment right and testify at trial, the 
exculpatory testimony will not be heard. In this respect joinder acts to silence the witnesses 
that may be the most helpful to the defendants case. For a classical explanation of this 
problem, see Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 73, 143 
(1974); Russell D. Covey, Beating the Prisoner at the Prisoner's Dilemma: The Evidentiary 
Value of a Witness's Refusal to Testify, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 105 (1997). 
240. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 
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circumscribed than its US counterpart. The rule generally proscribes 
that where "the prosecution allege[ s] a common design, the acts and 
declarations of [conspirators] in furtherance of the common design, 
even though in absence of the other, are admissible evidence against 
both to prove the existence and carrying out of the common design."241 
The exception applies whether or not a crime was committed to further 
the conspiracy, and whether or not the maker of the statement was 
jointly tried and indicted. 242 Nevertheless, because the U.K. strongly 
favors small trials with minimal joinder of defendants, these advantages 
are rarely used. 
2. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
On December 15, 2004, a new law came into effect in the U.K. that 
dramatically changed the admissibility of "bad character" evidence.243 
Under the new statutory scheme, evidence of previous convictions and 
other reprehensible conduct can be adduced as evidence of the 
defendant's propensity to commit crimes of the kind charged. 244 This 
change will likely aid the prosecutors to obtain convictions of repeat 
offenders. Further, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 contains provisions 
unique to multi-defendant trials. Under section 101 ( e) a co-defendant 
can introduce evidence of another defendant's bad character when such 
evidence has "substantial probative value in relation to an important 
241. MURPHY, supra note 237, at 8.2.2.l; ARCHBOLD, supra note 221, § 34-60. 
242. MURPHY, supra note 237, at 8.2.2.2; ARCHBOLD, supra note 221, § 34-60. 
243. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 98-110, 112; R v. Bradley (2005), 1 Crim. 
App. 24 (Eng.) (holding that the provisions of the act applied to all trials and Newton 
hearings begun on or after the 15 December 2004). 
244. Criminal Justice Act 2003 § 98. That section defines bad character as evidence of, 
or of a disposition towards, misconduct on his part, other than evidence which (a) has to do 
with the alleged facts of the offence with which the defendant is charged, or (b) is evidence 
of misconduct in connection with the investigation or prosecution of that offence. Id. 
Under the new scheme "bad character evidence" is admissible in seven circumstances: 
(1) In criminal proceedings evidence of the defendant's bad character is admissible 
if, but only if-
a. all parties to the proceedings agree to the evidence being admissible, 
b. the evidence is adduced by the defendant himself or is given in answer to a 
question asked by him in cross-examination and intended to elicit it, 
c. it is important explanatory evidence, 
d. it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the 
prosecution, 
e. it has substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue 
between the defendant and a co-defendant, 
f. it is evidence to correct a false impression given by the defendant, or 
g. the defendant has made an attack on another person's character. 
Id. § 101. 
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matter in issue between the defendant and a co-defendant. "245 This 
provision aims to codify and liberalize the often murky law in cases 
where co-defendants are running "cutthroat" defenses.246 The provision 
provides that if the nature of one defendant's defense is to undermine 
the other, than evidence of the other defendants' "bad character" as to 
truthfulness is admissible.247 While courts have not had the occasion to 
interpret the provision, commentators and drafters generally agree that 
the test for admissibility (probative value in relation to an important 
matter in issue), which is a new concept in U .K. evidence law, will 
"likely to be interpreted [to mean] only as more than merely trivial."248 
Thus, defendants are able, and even encouraged, to act as a second 
prosecutor and adduce evidence against a co-defendant at trial. This 
section represents a substantial departure from the previous law 
regarding co-defendants and character evidence. While its effect 
remains to be seen, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has the potential to 
change the landscape of group trials in the U .K. 
3. Inadmissibility of Wiretap Evidence 
Up to this point, this Article has discussed nuances of U .K. 
evidence law that aid in the prosecution of criminal enterprises. Our 
common law neighbors have more liberal evidence rules regarding 
confessions, hearsay, and character evidence than the US. For that 
reason, the U.K. law with respect to wiretap evidence seems particularly 
draconian. In the U.K., evidence obtained from domestic wiretaps is 
inadmissible.249 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
245. Criminal Justice Act 2003 § lOl(e). 
246. Crown Prosecution Service, Bad Character Evidence (2004), available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/section13/chapter_uhtml#content (last visited July 17, 2005); 
ANDREW KOEGH, EVIDENCE OF BAD CHARACTER UNDER THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 19 
(2003 ), available at http://www.crimeline.info/badcharacter.pdf (last visited July 17, 2005). 
247. "A matter in issue between the defendant and a co-defendant" is defined as: 
( 1) Evidence which is relevant to the question whether the defendant has a 
propensity to be untruthful is admissible on that basis under section 101 (1 )( e) only if 
the nature or conduct of his defence is such as to undermine the co-defendant's 
defence. 
(2) Only evidence-
a. which is to be (or has been) adduced by the co-defendant, or 
which a witness is to be invited to give (or has given) in cross-examination by 
the co-defendant, 
b. is admissible under section lOl(l)(e). 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 § 104. 
248. Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 246; see also KEOGH, supra note 245, at 
19. 
249. l.H. DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 269-272 (2d ed. 2002); RICHARD MAY, 
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(RIP A) criminalizes the intentional interception of a communication 
without lawful authority in the course of transmission by means of a 
public telephone system. 250 The statute confers power to the Secretary 
of State to issue a warrant authorizing wiretapping when it is deemed 
necessary for the purposes of protecting the U .K. 's national security or 
economic well-being, or for the purposes of detecting serious crime. 251 
The Home Office claims that their use of wiretapping has prevented and 
disrupted terrorists and is widely used against drug rings.252 In 2003, 
the interceptions led to: 
• seizure of 26 tons of illicit drugs; 
• seizure of 10 tons of tobacco; 
• detection of £390m of financial crime; and 
• 1,680 arrests.253 
Thus, wiretapping is widely used in the U .K. pursuant to the RIP A 
warrant process, but its use is restricted to intelligence and not 
admissible in a court of law.254 
Paradoxically, evidence obtained from domestic microphone 
surveillance ("bugging") is admissible. 255 Evidence obtained via 
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 2-21 (4th ed. 2005). 
250. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, § 1(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter 
RIPA]. 
251. RIPA § 5(2)-(3). Those sections provide in full: 
(2) The Secretary of State shall not issue an interception warrant unless he 
believes-
a. that the warrant is necessary on the ground falling within subsection (3); and 
b. that the conduct authorized by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought 
to be achieved by that conduct. 
(3) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a warrant is necessary on 
grounds falling within this subsection if it is necessary-
a. in the interests of national security; 
b. for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; 
c. for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United 
Kingdom; or 
d. for the purpose, in circumstances appearing to the Secretary of State to be 
equivalent to those in which he would issue a warrant by virtue of paragraph (b ), 
by giving effect to the provisions of any international mutual assistance 
agreement. 
Id. § 5(2)-(3). 
252. Home Office, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/terrorism/faq/atcsa?faq.html#l (last visited July 17, 2005) 
[hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions]. 
253. Id. 
254. Morgans v. Dir. Of Pub. Prosecution, [2001] 1 A.C. 315 (U.K.). 
255. R v. Khan (Sultan), [1997] A.C. 558, 582 (U.K.) (admitting evidence obtained by 
bugging despite that the bugging operation constituted a civil trespass); l.H. DENNIS, THE 
LAW OF EVIDENCE 269-272 (2d ed. 2002). 
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wiretapping in another country is also admissible.256 Yet, the wealth of 
wiretap information obtained under the RIP A procedures cannot be used 
as evidence. The rationale proffered for this curious rule is that, by 
bringing covertly obtained evidence into the judicial process, 
intelligence agencies would have to reveal sensitive sources and 
methods of surveillance.257 Some argue that the court use of intercepted 
information would discourage serious criminals and terrorists from 
using the phone, thereby drying up a crucial source of information. 258 
256. R v. Aujla, [1998] 2 Crim. App. 16 (U.K.) (holding that evidence obtained from a 
Dutch wiretap place on telephone in the Netherlands and authorized by the Dutch authorities 
was admissible to prove a violation of British law in a U.K. court). 
257. Regina v. P, [2002] 1 A.C. 146 (U.K.); Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 
238. The Home Office, on their public website, explains this incongruent rule. The site 
states that: 
Our intelligence only approach, based on decades of dealing with terrorism, brings 
with it uniquely close co-operation between law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies. No other country in the world even gets close to this level of co-operation. 
None of those involved in this work here would be willing simply to swap our 
approach for any of the evidential schemes operating elsewhere. 
Id. Moves have been made to change this rule and adopt legislation that would allow 
wiretap evidence to be used in court. Specifically, a report last summer advocated for a 
three-tier warrant system issuing intelligence only, non-evidential, and evidential warrant, 
the latter requiring judicial authorization. The report concluded that such a law would result 
in a modest increase in convictions for some serious criminals, but not terrorists. Press 
Release, Charles Clarke, Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, U.K.: Statement by the Home 
Secretary on the "interception of communications" (Jan. 26, 2005), available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/jan/1 luk-intercepts-evidence.htm; see also 430 PARL. 
DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 1238 (statement of Mr. Mitchell). There, Mr. Mitchell 
remarked that right balance had not been struck with respect to effectiveness of intelligence 
services and the public interest in prosecuting certain cases. He said that: 
[U]nder the [proposed] clause, relaxing the ban [on wiretap evidence] would not 
place an obligation on the prosecution to use intercept evidence. It would simply 
allow the submission of intercept evidence in court and stand on a par with what is 
available to other agencies dealing with serious crime and terrorism. What is more, 
there are already eclectic and disparate cases in which intercept evidence is used in 
criminal courts, albeit as an exception to the general rule, and there has not been any 
damage to police or intelligence service operational capabilities and methodology. I 
submit that these experiences puncture the Government's objections to the use of 
intercept evidence and render the present state of the law in this area quite ludicrous. 
Id. To date, none of these reform efforts have been successful in altering this "ludicrous" 
and "disparate" rule. 
258. In debates before the House of Commons the Rt. Hon. Tom Harris justified the 
rule based on the experience in America with wiretaps. There he said: 
I want to address the issue of wire tap or intercept evidence . . . . The security 
services were extremely concerned that a crucial source of counter-terrorist 
information would dry up if wiretap evidence were permissible in court. 
Let us look at the American example. In many states in America where wire tap is 
allowed, that source of information has all but dried up because criminals-
members of the mafia and terrorists-understand that this that they say on the 
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Neither of these rationales can fully account for the U.K.'s 
"ludicrous" and "disparate" use of wiretap information. First, those 
who engage in organized crime or terrorism use circumspection when 
using the telephone, or for that matter, any form of communication. 
They are cautious because they might be under government 
surveillance, not because those statements might later be used in court. 
For this reason, wiretap evidence in the U.S. has not "dried up." 
Secondly, as the American experience with wiretapping has 
demonstrated, sensitive sources and methods can be protected without 
sacrificing this important source of evidence. The Classified 
Information Procedures Act (CIPA)259 is one possible model that 
provides for in camera, ex parte review of sensitive sources and 
methods. 
As the Home Office freely admits, wiretapping is used and is a 
fruitful source of information. That important source of information is 
not used in court proceedings and is a waste of valuable resources that 
could be used to bring criminals to justice. 
IV. THE "RICIN PLOT:" A CASE STUDY OF BRITISH JUSTICE 
Lord Woolf, in an article for the Times, recently quipped that "the 
standards of justice that the system is delivering are no better than that 
which were provided ... 50 years ago."260 The Lord Chief Justice is 
correct, but for altogether different reasons than he supposed. The 
practice direction,261 the proposed criminal justice reforms,262 and 
judge's preferences263 for trials of limited scope and length frustrate the 
telephone will inevitably be used against them in court, and are extremely careful 
not to say anything on the telephone. This is exactly why, I am glad, the 
Government have been very reluctant to conclude that the law should change. 
430 PARL. DEB., H.C. 1441 (2005) (statement of Rt. Hon. Tom Harris) (emphasis added). 
259. 18 U.S.C. App. §1-16 (2004). 
260. Lord Woolf, The Standards of Justice We Deliver Are No Better than 50 Years 
Ago. Why?, TIMES (London), April 5, 2005, at 4. The Lord Chief Justice goes on to state 
that the problem with the system is an influx of long and complex criminal fraud cases. 
These cases, he argues, should be "strictly confined" to a given time frame. He states that 
"there is a consensus that, save exceptional circumstances, no trial should be permitted to 
exceed a give period - some favour three months, others an outer limit of six months." Id. 
261. The conspiracy practice direction reads: "The judge should require the prosecution 
to justify the joinder, or, failing justification, to elect whether to proceed on the substantive 
or conspiracy counts. Practice Direction (Crime: Conspiracy), (1977) 1 W.L.R. 537 (Eng.). 
See supra text accompanying notes 210-216. 
262. See, e.g. DEPARTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A FAIRER DEAL FOR LEGAL 
Am, 2005, Cm. 6591 (U.K.), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/laid/laidfullpaper.pdf 
(proposing to cap the length of longer trials and encourage case management). 
263. See supra text accompanying notes 234-237. 
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prosecution of criminal enterprises. The paradigm of a British trial is 
simple: one defendant, one offense. It is a trial system that may or may 
not have been adequate for prosecuting "street crime," but it is wholly 
ineffectual when prosecuting organized crime, white-collar crime, or for 
that matter, the terrorist issues that the U.K. faces today. In short, one 
reason why the "standards of justice" have not improved in Britain over 
the last fifty years is that the trial system has not been modernized. The 
recent "ricin plot" illustrates the failure of these antiquated rules of 
joinder and severance to bring modern day criminals to justice. 
A. The Plot to Poison Britain 
In early January 2003, a raid on a flat in North London exposed all 
the makings for a chemical attack in Britain. 264 While there is yet to be 
any official report of the case, the news reports revealed a plot involving 
thirteen al-Qaeda operatives linked to the Abu Doha network and the 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in the U .K. 265 The group was 
allegedly planning to make ricin and nicotine poisons to plant on car 
door handles in the city. Additionally, the group had planned to taint 
toiletries, like Nivea face cream and toothbrushes in local shops.266 
The plot was uncovered after one critical member was 
apprehended and interrogated in Algeria.267 With this information, the 
264. Sean O'Neill, How High Street Poison Plot Ended in a Bedsit Bloodbath, TIMES 
(London), April 14, 2005, at 6 [hereinafter High Street Poison Plot]. 
265. See David Leppard & Nick Fielding, Ricin Defendants to Claim Asylum, SUNDAY 
TIMES (London), April 17, 2005, at 4. See also Sean O'Neil, Was Ricin the Last Act of 
Terror Cell?, TIMES (London), April 15, 2005 at 7 [hereinafter Last Act of Terror Cell]. 
While not charged with crimes in the ricin case, Abu Doha is widely regarded as a "senior 
terrorist," the leader of an Algerian extremist group in London, and former terrorist trainer 
in Afghanistan. Id. He allegedly recruited and "mentored" Ahmed Resam, who is in U.S. 
custody over the plotted millennium bomb attack on LAX, and Nizar Trabelsi, who is 
currently in prison in Belgium for plotting to bomb a NATO airbase. Id. Abu Doha is being 
held in Belmarsh, fighting possible extradition to the U.S .. Id. 
266. Stewart Tendler & Sean O'Neill, The al-Qaeda Plot to Poison Britain, TIMES 
(London), April 14, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Al-Qaeda Plot]. 
267. Sean O'Neill, Informer's Arrest Brought Down Plan, TIMES (London), April 14, 
2005, at 7 [hereinafter Informer's Arrest]. In December 2002, the Algerian government 
detained Mohammed Meguerba, a terrorist suspect with al-Qaeda connections. Id. Under 
interrogation, Meguerba revealed his plot with a man named "Nadir," with whom he 
claimed to have concocted ricin. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263. He confessed to 
the Algerian authorities that the attack planned "would not be a mass attack, but on chosen 
individual citizens" and that Jewish people were among the targets being considered. Id. 
While Meguerba claimed not to know the address where he and "Nadir" had worked, the 
information from this interrogation was enough to lead police to a North London flat. Id. 
It was later revealed that this information, along with a twenty-seven page confession, was 
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London police were led to a two-bedroom flat in Wood Green 
containing recipes and the ingredients to manufacture ricin. The flat 
contained several sets of recipes for making cyanide, ricin and other 
toxins, in addition to instructions to make explosives and detonators.268 
The police also confiscated "apple pips . . . cherry stones . . . castor 
beans and bottles of acetone, packets of plastic gloves, thermometers, 
digital scales and funnels," in short, the ingredients for ricin and a 
make-shift laboratory. 269 While ricin was not found in the flat, 
investigators did uncover one pot of Nivea face cream containing a 
nicotine poison. 270 
Passport photos from the flat led the police to Kamel Bourgass, 
identified in the interrogation in Algeria.271 In the hours after the flat 
raided, Bourgass, or "Nadir," fled to London for Bournemouth. He 
allegedly spent several days with an unidentified man who authorities 
believe was arranging Bourgass's escape.272 On January 14, nine days 
obtained under torture by the Algerian intelligence services (DRS). Reda Hassaine & Sean 
O'Neill, I Was Tortured, Says Ricin Plotter, THE TIMES (London), May 9, 2005 at 13 
[hereinafter Ricin Plotter]. Under U.K. law and multitude of international accords, a person 
who commits torture is subject to criminal liability and confessions obtained under torture 
are inadmissible in U.K. courts. See, e.g. R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary 
Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, (2000) 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) (U.K.); Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 76 (U.K.) [hereinafter PACE]. U.K. statutes, 
particularly PACE, contemplate the "fruit of the poisonous tree" problem and provides that 
even if a confession is obtained by oppression, the admissibility of "any facts discovered as 
a result of the confession" remains unaffected. PACE§ 76(4). Thus, in the criminal trial of 
the ricin defendants, the evidence obtained as a result of Meguerba's tortured confession 
would not be inadmissible for that reason alone. Conversely, the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission (SIAC), the only body wherein detained terrorist suspects can appeal 
their detention, can accept evidence given under torture, provided that the U.K. has not 
"procured or connived at" the torture. A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1123, [252] (U.K.). 
As the ricin case illustrates, the U.K. uses information obtained through torture for 
intelligence purposes. A recent government memo has permitted M16 to use this 
information, provided that no U.K. personnel took part in the torture. Robert Winnett, 
Torture Ruling, SUNDAY TIMES (London), March 27, 2005, at 10. 
268. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263. 
269. Id. 
270. Leppard & Fielding, supra note 264. The original police report claimed to have 
found ricin in the apartment. After DNA testing on the substance, police retracted the 
statement as a false positive. Id. 
271. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263. 
272. Id. The 100 arrests were primarily members of the Salafist Group for Preaching 
and Combat (GSPC), which has sent thousands of its members to training camps in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. Kim Sengupta & Jason Bennetto, Ricin Plot: Police Made 100 Arrests to 
Smash al-Qa'ida Network; Most Active Group had Sent Thousands of Members to Train, 
THE INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 14, 2005, at 5. The group is allegedly affiliated with Abu 
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after the raid on the North London flat, Anti-Terrorist Branch officers 
discovered and arrested both men. 273 Tragically, a botched arrest 
allowed Bourgass to break free. He stabbed Detective Constable 
Stephen Oake eight times before he was subdued. DC Stephen Oake 
died on the scene. 274 
Over 100 people were arrested in connection to the ricin plot. 275 
The police action in the case cost upwards of £20 million.276 Later, 
thirteen men were charged, including Bourgass, for their involvement in 
the plot. 277 The other twelve men charged were allegedly connected to 
Bourgass and the al-Qaeda sponsored Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC), an Algerian based terrorist cell.278 
1. Evidence of a Conspiracy 
Among those arrested and tried with Bourgass was Mouloud 
Sihali, a "wheelerdealer," who arranged flats and false papers for 
asylum seekers in London. Upon searching his flat, the police found 
five false passports, one with the picture of a key terrorist suspect. 279 
This search also lead to the arrest of David Khalef, a terrorist suspect 
who was in possession of a false passport and recipes to make ricin, 
cyanide, and botulinum. 280 
Additionally, Mustapha Taleb, an Algerian extremist, was charged 
after his fingerprints were found on two sets of recipes for ricin in 
Bourgass' London apartment. He admitted to handling and 
photocopying the recipes, but denied any knowledge of their contents. 
Taleb was convicted and charged in his absence of terrorism crimes in 
the Algeria unrelated to the ricin charge.281 The fingerprints of Kamel 
Doha who, according to a U.S. indictment, had personal permission form Osama bin Laden 
to construct the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan. RICO Enterprise Concept, supra 
note 51. 
273. Last Act of Terror Cell, supra note 264. 
274. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263. It is unclear from the articles the extent 
of the other officer's injuries. The news reports do point out that Bourgass was not 
handcuffed when he was apprehended. The officers feared that handcuffing the man would 
result in the destruction or contamination of possible evidence on his hands. Instead, the 
officers chose to guard him on both sides; a move that proved fatal for one officer. 
275. Id. 
276. Leppard & Fielding, supra note 264. 
277. Id. 
278. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263; Last Act of Terror Cell, supra note 264. 
279. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263. 
280. Id. 
281. Richard Ford, Series of Blunders Let a Terrorist Walk Free, TIMES (London), Apr. 
14, 2005, at 6. 
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Merzoug also were found in twenty-three places on the poison recipes. 
Merzoug, a resident alien, is known for using at least two false identities 
within Britain. 282 
2. The Trial(s) 
Originally, thirteen men including Bourgass were indicted for 
"conspiracy to make chemical or biological weapons."283 When 
secondary testing revealed that the only poison in the flat was a nicotine 
poison, the charges were replaced with charges of "conspiring to cause 
a public nuisance. "284 The Crown Prosecution Service elected to try the 
men in three groups: Bourgass for the murder of DC Stephen Oake, one 
trial on conspiracy charges against Bourgass and eight others, and one 
trial for the remaining four alleged conspirators. 
Bourgass was convicted and received a life sentence for the murder 
and further jail time for attempted murder and wounding.285 In a second 
trial, Bourgass and eight other men were tried on charges of "conspiracy 
to cause a public nuisance by the 'use of poison or explosives to cause 
disruption, fear, or in-jury [sic]"' and conspiracy to murder.286 The 
eight other men included Mustapha Taleb and Kamel Merzoug, whose 
fingerprints were found extensively over the flat and ricin recipes, 
David Khalef, a man found in possession of ricin recipes, and Mouloud 
Sihali, the man responsible for supplying the group with false 
passports.287 Additionally, Sidali Feddag, Samir Asli, Mouloud 
Bouhrama, and Khalid Alwerfeli were joined, although little is known 
from the available sources of their participation in the plot.288 Four 
other men were charged in the conspiracy and awaited a second, 
separate trial for their participation. 
3. Outcome of the Ricin Trial 
After deliberating for more than seventy-four hours, the jury 
cleared four of Bourgass' co-defendants and convicted four of 
282. Id. 
283. Leppard & Fielding, supra note 264. 
284. See id. 
285. Russell Jenkins & Stewart Tendler, Bungled Special Branch Raid Left Policeman 
Dead; Ricin Plot, THE TIMES (London), Apr. 14, 2005, at 8. 
286. Al-Qaeda Plot, supra note 265. 
287. Leppard & Fielding, supra note 264; Ford, supra note 280; Rosie Cowan & 
Duncan Campbell, Ricin Plot: Detective Murdered by Obsessive Loner: Illegal Immigrant 
had Trained with al-Qaida, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 14, 2005, at 9. 
288. Al-Qaeda Plot, supra note 265. 
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immigration crimes. 289 Only Bourgass was convicted in the conspiracy 
charge. He was sentenced to seventeen years for his involvement.290 
The second trial of the remaining four alleged conspirators was 
abandoned, and the men were officially cleared.291 
Thus, the multi-million pound investigation and trial of the "most 
wanted terrorist suspect in Britain" was a bust.292 The prosecution had 
already obtained more than a life sentence for Mohammed Bourgass. 
The four men convicted of passport offenses will be released soon, as 
their sentences are only slightly longer than the time already served. 293 
The remaining eight men cleared are in the process of seeking asylum in 
the U .K. on the grounds that the ricin trial prevents them from returning 
home because of probable torture. 294 A senior Scotland Yard official 
said that the outcome of the trial was "disappointing," to put it mildly.295 
While the outcome of the ricin case certainly is "disappointing," it 
is not entirely improbable. Since September 11, 2001, the British police 
have made 702 arrests under the powers granted to them by the 
Terrorism Act of 2000. 296 These arrests have produced a meager 
seventeen convictions for terrorist offences.297 The ricin case is an 
illustration of need for a change in the U .K. criminal justice system. Sir 
Ian Blair, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, blamed the 
acquittals on the lack of a substantive law to tie together "very loose-
knit conspiracies" and deal specifically with "acts preparatory to 
terrorism. "298 
289. Id. Mustapha Taleb and Kamel Merzoug, whose fingerprints were found 
extensively over the flat and ricin recipes were completely exonerated at trial. David 
Khalef, the man found in possession of ricin recipes, and Mouloud Sihali, the man 
responsible for supplying the group with false passports were sentenced to 3 years and 15 
months respectively for possessing false passports. Ford, supra note 280. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. 
292. Jenkins & Tendler, supra note 284. See also Leppard & Fielding, supra note 264. 
293. Al-Qaeda Plot, supra note 265. 
294. Leppard & Fielding, supra note 264. 
295. Id. 
296. Robert Verkaik, Ricin Plot: What Now for the Terror Laws?, THE INDEPENDENT 
(London), Apr. 14, 2005, at 4. 
297. Id. 
298. Stephen Pollard, Oh, Do Shut Up, Sir Jan, TIMES (London), Apr. 18, 2005, at 20. 
The Terrorism Act of 2000 provides such an offence criminalizing acts preparatory to 
terrorism. Section 57(1) states that: "A person commits an offense if he possesses an article 
in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is for a 
purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. 
Id.; Terrorism Act of 2000, c. 11, § 57(1) (2000) (U.K.). Nevertheless, the offence does not 
tie together offences and offenders, nor does it abrogate the practice direction severing the 
conspiracy and substantive counts. 
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The U.K. trial system, which prefers simple trials of one defendant 
charged with a single crime, militates strongly against prosecuting 
"loose-knit conspiracies." This approach, while serviceable when 
prosecuting street crime, is utterly unworkable when faced with 
terrorism crimes. The ricin case illustrates the need for a RICO-type 
statute with predicate offenses tailored to the needs of a terrorism 
prosecution. Such a law would modernize U .K. trial procedures and 
make a single trial of an entire terrorist cell possible and appropriate. 
B. The Anatomy of a Hypothetical Ricin RICO 
RICO has been a successful tool for American prosecutors faced 
with the "very loose knit" conspiracies Sir Ian Blair mentions. While, 
as the White Paper states, making a RICO case involves exponentially 
more proof, 299 the benefits of a RICO trial are manifold. A RICO trial 
would join the thirteen defendants and their diverse offenses in one trial. 
A RICO trial would allow for the more liberal admission of evidence of 
the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) or al-Qaeda, 
groups that all thirteen conspirators were allegedly members. 300 
Because such a trial places terrorism activity in context and allows the 
jury to see exactly what the defendants did, trying the ricin case as a 
RICO case would have been more likely to secure convictions against 
the ricin thirteen. 
1. Joinder of Offenses and Offenders 
The ricin thirteen were not tried in one trial for their involvement, 
most probably because they could not be. In the ricin case, the U .K. 
practice direction and strong judicial preference for a short, simple trial 
forced the thirteen men to be tried in three "shorter" trials. Bourgass' 
trial for murder and assault were severed from the conspiracy and 
passport offenses. As a result, in the second trial for conspiracy to 
create a public nuisance and conspiracy, the defense portrayed the plot 
as an ultimately abortive plan, carried out by men without the faculties, 
intelligence, or will to kill.301 Newspaper reports of the Bourgass' first 
299. White Paper, supra note 4, at 6.01. 
300. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263; Last Act of Terror Cell, supra note 264; 
Verkaik, supra note 295. 
301. One commentator at the trial quipped that Bourgass "presumably intended to try 
to make the stuff [ricin], but was clearly a hare-brained nut" and that his conspirators were 
"no more than a bunch of illegal immigrants and passport forgers, of whom thousands must 
be loose in Britain." Simon Jenkins, A Sledgehammer for a Nut, TIMES (London), Apr. 15, 
2005, at 20. At trial, Bourgass was asked about a bag discovered in the flat in which the 
recipes were hidden. He claimed he had found it in the street in Brixton. When asked why 
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trial and conviction for murder and four counts of attempted murder 
were shielded from the jury. 302 The second trial of Bourgass and eight 
other men, alluded to ties with terrorist groups, suggesting that the 
conspiracy was "in furtherance of [an] extremist Islamic cause" but the 
ricin plotters' membership in terrorist organizations were spoken of in 
veiled terms.303 Bourgass's training at an al-Qaeda camp and the other 
defendants' membership in the Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC) were not revealed at the trial.304 Further, because the 
conspiracy trial was severed in two, a jury never saw the full 
membership of the group. 305 At trial, the group looked like a 
"ramshackle operation" without the organization to do any real harm. 306 
In short, the trial failed to secure conviction of the terrorist cell because 
a terrorist cell was never on trial. The individuals and offenses were 
severed from each other, making it impossible for the judge and jury to 
see exactly what the offenders had done. 
A RICO case would join the defendants and offenses and make a 
single trial possible. In prosecuting the ricin case as a hypothetical 
RI CO conspiracy, a prosecutor could name the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat (GSPC) or al-Qaeda as a RICO enterprise and all 
thirteen conspirators as members.307 In the ricin case, RICO's 
he had kept it, he replied "because I'm stupid." Cowan & Duncan, supra note 286. Thus, 
jurors were left with the notion that the defendants were essentially harmless when, as the 
murder of DC Stephen Oake proved, this was anything but the truth. 
302. Pollard, supra note 297. Conversely, the evidence of the ricin plot was put before 
the jury in the murder case. Steven Morris, New appeals put anti-terrorism measures to 
test, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 19, 2005, at 6. 
303. Duncan Campbell & Rosie Cowan, Ricin Plot: Terror Trail that led from Algeria 
to London: One Jailed, Four Freed after Jury Deadlocked at end of Eight Month, £20m, 
Trial, THE GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 14, 2005, at 8. 
304. See Dodd, supra note 302; Last Act of Terror Cell, supra note 264. 
305. As a result, the reports of the trial seem to reach the consensus that Bourgass was 
"a murderous and inept loner" who acted alone. As one reporter objects: 
Who then . . . supplied him with multiple ID papers, activated him, provided safe houses 
and taught him to use a knife to kill one and gravely injure three other police officers? And 
if Bourgass was acting alone, how come there were four sets of his poison recipes and 
fingerprints of several people all over them? 
Sean O'Neill, Be Afraid in Your Armchair, TIMES, Apr. 20, 2005, at 18 [hereinafter 
Armchair]. 
306. Campbell & Cowan, supra note 302. 
307. A RICO enterprise "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, 
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a 
legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (4) (2006). Naming the Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC) or al-Qaeda as a RICO enterprise, would cast the "enterprise" in the 
"perpetrator" role. RICO Enterprise Concept, supra 55, at 656. 
Courts have held that this definition includes "wholly illegitimate" organizations. United 
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 584-585 (1981). Furthermore, the Supreme Court in 
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enterprise concept would function as a joinder mechanism, allowing 
joinder of defendants "employed by or associated with" an enterprise, or 
who "conspire[] to violate section 1962( c )."308 A RICO statute tailored 
to the needs of a terrorist prosecution could include crimes of violence, 
possession or manufacture of poisons, and immigration offenses as 
"predicate activity. "309 Under the language of section 1962( c ), if these 
offenses are committed by a defendant or another similarly joined to the 
enterprise and is committed in the "affairs" of the enterprise, then they 
can all be properly joined in a single trial.310 
2. Overcoming U.K. Objections to Joinder 
The suggestion that the liberal joinder of offenses and offenders is 
advantageous and even necessary to promote justice faces vehement 
opposition in the U.K., where long trials are the problem, not the 
solution.311 The U.K.'s most recent criminal reform project, A Fairer 
Deal for Legal Aid, goes so far as proposing a cap on the length of 
longer trials and removing the jury from complicated cases.312 This 
National Organization of Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, held that no economic motive was 
required to violate RICO. 510 U.S. 249 (1994). 
308. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 8. 
309. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)(2006). 
310. 18 U.S.C. §1962 (c); RICO Enterprise Concept, supra note 55, at 654-55. As 
shown in Section II above, RICO would allow for the more liberal admission of evidence. 
For example, because the "enterprise" is an essential part of making a RICO case, the 
prosecution could adduce evidence of the internal structure al-Qaeda or the Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). See RICO Enterprise Concept, supra note 55. See also 
United States v. Salemo, 686 F.2d 534, 536 (2d. Cir. 1987). 
In addition to the evidentiary advantages that RICO presents, prosecutors in the U.K. have 
an added advantage. The Criminal Justice Act (2003) changed the law with respect to 
character evidence, allowing the free admission of previous convictions when those 
previous convictions tend to prove a "matter in issue between the defendant and the 
prosecution." Criminal Justice Act of 2003, c. 44, § lOl(l)(d) (2003) (U.K.), available at, 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/20030044.htm. The act goes on to define a "matter in 
issue between the defendant and the prosecution" as the "question whether the defendant 
has a propensity to commit offenses of the kind with which he is charged, except where his 
having such a propensity makes it no more likely that he is guilty of the offence." Id. § 103 
(l)(a). Thus, under the new act, one defendant's past conviction for terrorist offense, would 
be admissible. 
311. The discussion assumes that, when Lord Woolf wrote, The Standards of Justice 
we deliver are no better than 50 years ago, Why?, he was speaking of justice not only as the 
speedy resolution of claims but also as the accuracy of those resolutions. See Woolf, supra 
note 246. While there is no official report of the ricin case a reading of the news and other 
media reveal overwhelming evidence of the defendants' guilt. That much of this evidence 
was not put before the jury, or at least not put before the same jury and in a single case, 
shows the U .K. trial procedure as actively working against accurate results and justice. 
312. DEPARTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A FAIRER DEAL FOR LEGAL AID 5.40 
(2005), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/laid/laidfullpaper.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 
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reform was instigated by the bourgeoning £2.1 billion legal aid budget 
that the Department of Constitutional Affairs proposes to reduce by 
limiting complex cases. 
A survey of the longest thirty cases heard between 2003-2004 
showed that: 
• The average length of these trials was 67 days.313 
• On average, six defendants were tried in these cases.314 
• The average number of prosecution witnesses was 114.315 
The objection to joint trials is not just their length, it also is a 
general distrust of a juror's ability to remember the evidence presented 
over a longer trial and differentiate between defendants.31 In the 
speech announcing these proposals, Lord Falconer of Thornton QC, the 
leader of the reform project, stated "[t]he days of the 18-month trial are 
over . . . . Any jury in the world would find it almost impossible to 
remember properly what was said 18 months ago. Most cases should 
not last longer than a few months."317 
Since the passage of RICO and the advent of the "enterprise trial," 
U.S. courts have had several occasions to examine the policies behind 
joinder and larger trials.318 For the most part, the fears expressed by 
Lord Falconer, Lord Woolf, and others are unfounded. 
First, joint trials do not necessarily increase the cost of 
adjudication. Instead, joinder prevents the unnecessary repetition of 
evidence.319 Not only does this save a prosecutor the time of presenting 
evidence twice (at twice the cost), but it also saves the sometimes 
recalcitrant witness the hassle of reappearing. This becomes 
particularly important in terrorism cases, where witnesses require 
special arrangements to attend trial because they present a security 
2006) [hereinafter A FAIRER DEAL FOR LEGAL Arn]; Lord Woolf, supra note 259. 
313. AFAIRERDEALFORLEGALAID, supra note 311, at 5.5 . 
314. Id. 
315. Id. 
316. See Frances Gibb, Length and Cost of Trials to be Cut, TIMES (London), May 11, 
2005, at 22. 
317. Id. 
318. See Brendan Judge, Note, No Easy Solutions in the Problem of Criminal Mega-
trials, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211 (1990); FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON SECOND 
CIRCUIT COURTS, A PROPOSAL CREA TED BY EXTREMELY LONG CRIMINAL TRIALS, 128 
F.R.D. 137 (1989) [hereinafter FEDERAL BAR COMMITTEE]; Paul Marcus, Prosecuting 
White-Collar Crime: Re-Evaluating Large Multiple-Defendant Criminal Prosecutions, 11 
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 67 (2002). 
319. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993). Additionally, they 
"promote efficiency and serve the interest of justice by avoiding scandal and inequity of 
inconsistent verdicts." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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risk. 320 Thus, while the U.K. is seeking to save money from the legal 
aid defense budget, any savings it realizes will probably be offset by an 
increase in the Crown Prosecution Office's spending and Prison 
Services.321 
Second, to say that the jury is unable to perform its function and 
differentiate between defendants is both speculative and untrue. 322 Even 
in the largest cases, jurors have been able to differentiate between 
defendants. For example, in one of the largest cases ever, United States 
v. Casamento, the jury heard testimony from more than 275 witnesses 
over a seventeen month trial of 31 defendants.323 Despite the duration 
and complexity of the trial, the jury was able to differentiate the 
defendants; several were acquitted on the continuing criminal enterprise 
charge and one defendant was acquitted on a narcotics charge.324 This 
is not to say that every trial should become a seventeen month affair but 
it does illustrate that U.S. juries are able to differentiate between 
defendants and recall the content of evidence delivered over a seventeen 
Id. 
320. FEDERAL BAR COMMITTEE, supra note 318, at 138. The report states that: 
The government's apparent preference for lengthier joint trials rather than shorter 
separate trials is often based on defensible policies, such as the efficiency of one 
long trial, a desire to present a full picture of a complex multi-defendant criminal 
scheme, an interest in limiting the number of appearances by government witnesses 
who may be reluctant to testify at all or whose appearances may present security 
problems, or a reluctance to allow the discovery that might be the side effect of 
multiple trials. 
321. See e.g., Lord Woolf, supra note 259. He states that "there is no satisfactory 
liaison between the courts and the Prison Service or between the police and the Crown 
Prosecution Service. Among the consequences were that trials were often interrupted 
because of the late arrival of defendants from prison ... and witnesses did not attend court 
when required." Id. 
322. See G. Robert Blakely, RICO: Federal Experience (Criminal and Civil) and an 
Analysis of Attacks Against the Statute, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE 
UNITED ST ATES 451, 460-67. That RICO makes for long, burdensome trials is a myth. For 
example, "an analysis of reported RICO opinions shows that of over 400 opinions that 
provided information regarding trial length, only six trials were found to last over six 
months. The vast majority (76.4 percent) were shorter than three months." Id. at 460. 
While not all RICO charges are quickly resolved, these figures indicate that a RICO trial is 
typically not the monstrously long trial the British fear. 
A second concern, that juries in complex enterprise trials are confused and use evidence 
admitted against one defendant against all defendants. The evidence will have a prejudicial 
spill-over effect, and jurors will convict defendants who, in an individual trial, would not 
have been convicted. It is not obvious from this claim that the reverse might also be true. 
Jurors may acquit a defendant because he appeared comparatively less guilty than a co-
defendant. In short, "where multiple defendants are on trial, it is .. . at least as likely that 
'innocence by comparison' rather than 'guilt by association' will obtain. Id. at 463 . 
323. United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1989). 
324. Id. at 1151. 
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month span. 325 
Last, the argument that the U.K. needs a RICO-type statute to 
modernize both their substantive and procedural law should not be 
dismissed if only for one important reason: RICO is effective.326 In 
1969, the Committee on the Judiciary in the United States Senate issued 
a report listing 288 "made members" of the mob, that is, those members 
in the highest levels of leadership. 327 In 1988, eighteen years after 
RICO's adoption, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations held a 
second set of hearings, this time naming over a thousand known la Cosa 
Nostra (LCN) members in all levels of leadership.328 When comparing 
the two lists of members and their resulting convictions and jail time 
served, after RICO, more high ranking LCN members were 
convicted. 329 Of the LCN members identified in 1969, members served 
an average of 46 months in prison over their lifetime, or just under four 
years.330 By contrast, the LCN member identified in the 1988 hearings 
325. Indeed the Casamento court itself took issue with the length and complexity of the 
trial. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the defendants' convictions but stated that it 
had "misgivings about trials of this magnitude." Id. The court went on to issue benchmarks 
to district courts facing such large trials. In those cases when a trial is expected to exceed 
four months, the prosecutor has the burden of an "especially compelling justification" for 
joinder. Id. at 1152. The Judge should "explore" severance with the prosecutor, and 
determine if smaller trials of easily ·proven defenses that "carry exposure to adequate 
maximum penalties" is more appropriate. Id. See also United States v. Gambino, 729 
F.Supp. 954, 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (following the Casamento benchmarks and severing a 
twelve defendant trial into two groups). But see United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 414 
(6th Cir. 2000) (declining to follow Casamento benchmarks). 
326. See James B. Jacobs & Lauryn P. Gouldin, Costa Nostra: The Final Chapter?, 25 
CRIME & JUSTICE 129 (1999). 
327. Measure Relating to Organized Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Criminal Laws and Proc. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary , 91 st Cong. 125 ( 1969). 
328. Organized Crime: 25 Years after Valachi: Hearing before the Permanent 
Subcomm. on Investigation of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 1 OOth Cong. (1988). 
329. To ensure the reliability of data, the only sources in this study were the Committee 
Hearings, Lexis Law, and the Historical New York Times. A keyword search was 
conducted for each named member in the Federal and State Cases database, All News, and 
the New York Times Data Base. Indictments resulting in a trial were noted; indictments not 
resulting in a trial were not. The date of sentencing is recorded, if available. In the event it 
was not, the date of the first post-trial opinion is recorded. Other data recorded includes 
name, date of birth, date of death, cause of death, position in the crime family, and any 
known aliases. Through this method the researcher recorded data on the Bonanno family, 
one of the 5 major crime families operating in New York City. This study is not exhaustive, 
but it does represent a large sample population for comparing convictions and sentences. 
330. This is preliminary data obtained for a small size of 140 LCN members of the 
Bonanno crime family. Of the 25 Bonanno family members identified in 1969, all but 5 
members were charged with a crime in their lifetime. That the high ranking members 
served less than four years in prison over their lifetime demonstrates a failure of the law to 
secure meaningful convictions that incapacitate criminals. Often these members were 
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served an average of 68 months (almost 7 years) for each conviction, 
with many members convicted two or three times. 331 Of the members 
identified in the 1988 hearings, thirty percent went on to be convicted in 
for RICO or a RICO conspiracy. By far, LCN members charged with 
RICO violations served the most prison time. Those charged with 
RICO, including those charged with a RICO violation who later plea 
bargained, served an average of twelve years.332 Ten percent of those 
charged with a RICO violation received a life sentence. 
A "well-designed and tried RICO prosecution is a thing of beauty." 
It places the racketeering or terrorism activity in context and allows the 
jury to see exactly what the defendants have done. For these reasons, 
trying the ricin case as a RICO case would be more likely to secure 
convictions against the ricin thirteen, that is, to do justice. Passing a 
RICO-type statute would serve to update the antiquated U.K. trial 
system to more effectively deal with phenomena like terrorism in 
modern society. Further, the success of the RICO statute in the U.S. 
would not have been as dramatic if not for the wealth of evidence 
provided under the requirements of Title III, the wiretap statute.333The 
U .K.' s inconsistent position on wiretap evidence is justified on the basis 
that "a crucial source of counter-terrorist information would dry up if 
wire tap evidence were permissible in court."334 Put differently, the 
objection is not that wire tapping is not or should not be used in the 
U.K.; it is that its use in court would reveal sensitive sources and 
methods or, alternatively, provide a powerful deterrent to terrorist from 
using the phone. This Article argues that a statute like the Classified 
Information Procedures Act, combined with the U.K. 's existing 
procedures, would protect sensitive sources and methods, so as not to 
reveal how domestic surveillance is done. 335 If used in court, wiretap 
charged with crimes like criminal contempt or obstruction of justice that carried minimal 
sentences. 
331. This data omits numerous life sentences that are still being served and thus cannot 
be quantified. Again, this preliminary data was obtained from a 140 person sample of the 
Bonanno crime family . Of the 115 members identified in 1988, researchers were able to find 
convictions of 71 members. Of these 71 members convicted, 29 were prosecuted several 
times, indicating a high (40%) chance of recidivism. Of the 71 convicted, 36 were convicted 
for RICO or RICO conspiracy. 
332. This data omits RICO trials that are still pending or where the sentence remained 
unpublished. The average is far less than RICO's twenty year penalty because a majority 
( 60%) reportedly plea bargained. The data also omits the three life sentences obtained; 
because the sentences are still being served, they cannot be quantified. 
333. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 
(1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2006)). 
334. 430 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 1441 (U.K.). 
335. Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) 
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evidence would not "dry up," as for several reasons, that has not been 
the case in the U.S. experience. 
Moreover, wiretap should not be ignored for an additional reason: 
it is effective. During 2002, electronic surveillance led to 1,617 arrests 
and 2,066 convictions.336 Wiretap evidence is a particularly important 
source of evidence when prosecuting a RICO case. Of the RICO cases 
surveyed, 95% of the RICO convictions used electronic surveillance. 337 
For all of these reasons, the U .K. should consider amending their 
otherwise liberal rules of evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the RICO as part of a comprehensive effort to 
change the means by which the government attacked enterprise 
criminality. The statute makes a single trial of all "siblings" in a crime 
"family" possible and appropriate. It permits a judge and jury to 
understand exactly what the defendants have done, in a way that the 
American and English common law procedural and evidentiary rules 
did not. 
The success of RICO makes it an appealing model for other 
nations' legislation. In late 2004, when the U.K. proposed law 
enforcement reforms with respect to organized crime, it looked to 
RICO. Nevertheless, its evaluation of the statute is largely innocent of 
the procedural and evidentiary considerations involved in effective 
prosecution of enterprise criminality. For all of these reasons, the U.K. 
should consider updating its trial procedure in order to take advantages 
of the procedural advantages a joint trial affords against all forms of 
enterprise criminality, including terrorism. 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. App. 3, §§ 1-16 (2006)). 
336. Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Report on 
Application for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire, Oral, or 
Electronic Communications 5 (2003), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap03/contents.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2006). 
337. Again, this information is preliminary data, found by using the Bonanno crime 
family data as the sole source of information. This percentage may even be higher, but due 
to limitations in the information available, this is the only percentage that can be stated with 
any degree of certainty. 
66
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2006], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol34/iss1/3
